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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE COURT'S JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) of Utah Code 
Annotated, and Rules 3 and 4 of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
L THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF FIRST SOUTHWESTERN TITLE IN 
HOLDING THAT FIRST SOUTHWESTERN DID NOT BREACH ITS 
DUTY AS TRUSTEE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The first issue for review is whether the trial court erred in granting First 
Southwestern Title's Motion for Summary Judgment, wherein the trial court held that 
First Southwestern did not breach its duty as trustee by canceling the IndyMac Notice of 
Default despite the fact that the beneficiary of record, RJW Media, did not request that 
the Notice be cancelled, and even though First Southwestern Title did not take any effort 
to verify that the default had been cured and the trust deed had been reinstated pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. §57-1-31. This issue was preserved for appeal in First Southwestern's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 348-49, RJW Media's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R. 233-39, and the Court's September 22, 2006 Ruling and Order, R. 520-33. 
An appellate court should "consider the record as a whole and review the district 
court's grant of summary judgment de novo, reciting all facts and fair inferences drawn 
from the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Poteet v. White, 
2006 UT 63, \ 7, 147 P.3d 439. Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine 
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c); Glover v. Boy Scouts, 923 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1996). In 
making that determination, the appellate court must "view the facts and all reasonable 
2 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." 
Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62, If 14, 52 P.3d 1179. 
It is well settled that summary judgment should not be granted with respect to a 
breach of standard of care claim unless the applicable standard is "fixed by law" and 
"reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under 
the circumstances." White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994); Wycalis v. 
Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). As a result, "a trial court 
may not grant summary judgment and thereby deny the plaintiff a trial on the negligence 
issue, including resolving the applicable standard of care, unless it correctly concludes 
that the jury could not reasonably find defendant's conduct to be negligent." Wycalis, 
780 P.2d at 826. Because summary judgment is a question of law, the Court affords no 
deference to the District Court's legal conclusions. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. 
Blomquist, 113 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). Instead, this Court determines whether the 
District Court erred in applying governing law and determining that no disputed factual 
issues exist. Id. 
3 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CIT IN HOLDING THAT RJW MEDIA 
COULD NOT PROVE THE MALICE ELEMENT OF SLANDER OF 
TITLE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The second issue for review is whether the trial court erred in granting CIT's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, wherein the trial court held that CIT's recording of a 
notice of default against property did not constitute Slander of Title even though CIT 
knew that RJW Media purchased the property at foreclosure and CIT Group knew that its 
interest in the property had been extinguished at foreclosure. This issue was preserved 
for appeal in CIT's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 594-604, RJW Media's 
Opposition to CIT's Motion for Summary Judgment, 624-35, and the District Court's 
April 18, 2007 Ruling and Order on that Motion, R. 677-95. 
An appellate court is to "consider the record as a whole and review the district 
court's grant of summary judgment de novo, reciting all facts and fair inferences drawn 
from the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Poteet, 2006 UT 63 
at \ 7. Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact 
exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. UTAH R. CIV. P. 
56(c); Glover v. Boy Scouts, 923 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1996). In reviewing the District 
Court's order granting summary judgment, this Court considers the evidence and the 
inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party below. 
Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62, ^ 14, 52 P.3d 1179; LMVLeasing, 
Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189, 192 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
4 
Because summary judgment is a question of law, the Court affords no deference to 
the District Court's legal conclusions. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 173 
P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). Instead, this Court determines whether the trial court erred 
in applying governing law and properly determined that no disputed factual issues exist. 
Id With respect to torts, "[tjrial courts must exercise caution in granting summary 
judgment where tortious conduct is alleged," given the factual nature of these disputes. 
Richards Irrigation Co. v. Karren, 880 P.2d 6, 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)); see also 
Mumfordv. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 858 P.2d 1041 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding 
that where a trier of fact may or may not find tortious conduct on the part of a defendant, 
summary judgment is inappropriate). Moreover, even if the parties do not disagree about 
basic facts, "the understanding, intention, and consequences of those facts," if disputed, 
become "matters that can only be resolved at trial." Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291, 
1292 (Utah 1978). 
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STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 (2007) 
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of any obligation secured by a 
trust deed has, prior to the maturity date fixed in the obligation, become due or been 
declared due by reason of a breach or default in the performance of any obligation 
secured by the trust deed, including a default in the payment of interest or of any 
installment of principal, or by reason of failure of the trustor to pay, in accordance with 
the terms of the trust deed, taxes, assessment, premiums for insurance, or advances made 
by the beneficiary in accordance with terms of the obligation or of the trust deed, the 
trustor or the trustor's successor in interest in the trust property or any part of the trust 
property or any other person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record on the 
trust property or any beneficiary under a subordinate trust deed, at any time within three 
months of the filing for record of notice of default under the trust deed, if the power of 
sale is to be exercised, may pay to the beneficiary or the beneficiary's successor in 
interest the entire amount then due under the terms of the trust deed (including costs and 
expenses actually incurred in enforcing the terms of the obligation, or trust deed, and the 
trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred) other than that portion of the principal as 
would not then be due had no default occurred, and thereby cure the existing default. 
After the beneficiary or beneficiary's successor in interest has been paid and the default 
cured, the obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated as if no acceleration had occurred. 
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(2) If the default is cured and the trust deed reinstated in the manner provided in 
Subsection (1), and a reasonable fee is paid for cancellation, including the cost of 
recording the cancellation of notice of default, the trustee shall execute, acknowledge, 
and deliver a cancellation of the recorded notice of default under the trust deed; and any 
trustee who refuses to execute and record this cancellation within 30 days is liable to the 
person curing the default for all actual damages resulting from this refusal. A 
reconveyance given by the trustee or the execution of a trustee's deed constitutes a 
cancellation of a notice of default. Otherwise, a cancellation of a recorded notice of 
default under a trust deed is, when acknowledged, entitled to be recorded and is sufficient 
if made and executed by the trustee in substantially the following form .... 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 57-l-21.5(l)(a) (2007). 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), the following duties of the trustee may 
not be delegated: 
(a) the preparation and execution of: 
(i) the notice of default and election to sell; 
(ii) the cancellation of notice of default and election to sell; 
(iii) the notice of sale; and 
(iv) the trustee's deed; 
7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case 
This case involves claims by RJW Media alleging negligent conduct by First 
Southwestern as trustee of a deed of trust and against CIT as a junior lien holder who 
attempted to foreclose on property after its interest had been extinguished. R. 1-18. The 
appeal is from the trial court's Ruling and Order dated September 22, 2006, granting 
summary judgment in favor of First Southwestern regarding its actions as trustee, R. 491-
538, and the trial court's Ruling and Order dated April 18, 2006, awarding summary 
judgment to CIT regarding RJW Media's slander of title claim, R. 677-95. 
B. Disposition in the Court Below 
1. RJW Media filed a Complaint on July 20, 2005, claiming the right to quiet 
title to certain real property (the "Property") in RJW Media's name, and also alleging 
slander of title and breach of trustee's duty against CIT and First Southwestern, 
respectively. R. 1-18. 
2. RJW Media obtained a Temporary Restraining Order on September 29, 
2005 to prevent CIT from attempting to foreclose its junior lien on the Property. R. 93-
97. 
3. On September 22, 2006, the trial court granted RJW Media's Motion for 
Summary Judgment against CIT, holding that CIT's interest in the Property was 
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extinguished at RJW Media's December 13, 2004 Trustee's Sale of the Property and 
quieting title to the Property in RJW Media's favor. R. 493-510. 
4. On September 22, 2006, the trial court granted First Southwestern's Motion 
for Summary Judgment against RJW Media, holding that First Southwestern did not 
breach its duty to RJW Media as trustee when it cancelled the recorded Notice of Default, 
upon which RJW Media relied in conducting its December 13, 2004 Trustee's Sale. R. 
511-37. 
5. On April 18, 2007, the trial court granted CIT's Motion for Summary 
Judgment against RJW Media, holding that CIT was not liable to RJW Media for slander 
of title because RJW Media could not prove the malice element of its claim. R. 677-95. 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. The Property at issue is a large ski-in/ski-out residence identified by a 
physical address of 2350 West Red Pine Court, located in Park City, Summit County, 
Utah, and more particularly described as follows: 
LOT 3 DUTCH DRAW AT CANYON ESTATES 
SUBDIVISION, PARK CITY, UTAH, ACCORDING TO 
THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON FILE IN THE 
OFFICE OF THE SUMMIT COUNTY RECORDER. 
(Memo, in Support of MS J Against CIT at 2) R. 221. 
2. In 2001, the Property was encumbered by a first deed of trust executed in 
favor of IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., (the "IndyMac Trust Deed"), which secured a note in the 
9 
amount of $1.9 million. (Memo, in Support of MSJ Against CIT at 2; Complaint at ^[ 
14-16, Exhibits A to Complaint, Addendum A) R. 3, 221. 
3. On August 30, 2002, the Property was encumbered by a second deed of 
trust executed in favor of CIT (the "CIT Trust Deed"). (Memo, in Support of MSJ 
Against CIT at 2) R. 221. 
4. CIT is a $60 billion company whose primary business is mortgage, lending 
and foreclosure. (Reply in Support of MSJ Against CIT at 6; Rule 30 (b)(6) Depo. of 
CIT at 5, Addendum B) R. 375. 
5. In October, 2003, IndyMac Bank recorded a proper Notice of Default 
against the Property (the "Notice of Default"). (Memo, in Support of MSJ Against CIT 
at 2, Exhibit A to Memo, in Support of MSJ Against CIT, Addendum C) R. 221. 
6. On July 28, 2004, the IndyMac Note was assigned to RJW Media (the 
"RJW Agreement"). (Memo, in Support of MSJ Against CIT at 3, Exhibit B to Memo, in 
Support of MSJ Against CIT, Addendum D) R. 222. 
7. On September 9, 2004, RJW Media obtained a title report on the Property 
which indicated that there was a valid Notice of Default on the record. (Memo, in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Against CIT at 3, Exhibit C to Memo, in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Against CIT, Addendum E) R. 222. 
8. On the knowledge that a valid Notice of Default had been recorded against 
the Property, RJW Media proceeded to prepare to conduct a foreclosure sale of the 
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Property. (Memo, in Support of MSJ Against CIT at 3; Depo. Blake Parrish at 63, 
Addendum F) R. 222. 
9. On September 22, 2004, Appellee First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah 
O'First Southwestern"), then the trustee of the IndyMac Trust Deed, unilaterally issued a 
notice of cancellation of default ("Notice of Cancellation") at the request of IndyMac. 
(Memo in Support of MSJ Against First Southwestern at 3, Exhibit D to Memo in 
Support of MSJ Against First Southwestern; Rule 30(b)(6) Depo. of First Southwestern 
Title at 33, Addendum G) R. 235. 
10. However, IndyMac was not the record beneficiary at that time; the 
beneficiary of record was RJW Media. (Memo, in Support of MSJ Against First 
Southwestern at 3, Exhibit C to Memo, in Support of MSJ Against First Southwestern) R. 
235. 
11. First Southwestern acknowledged that RJW Media was the record 
beneficiary when the Notice of Cancellation was issued, and that First Southwestern 
owed a duty to RJW Media as the record beneficiary. (Rule 30(b)(6) Depo. of First 
Southwestern Title at 39, Addendum G) R. 235, 399. 
12. The Notice of Cancellation was issued without authorization from RJW 
Media, the record beneficiary, and without notice to RJW Media. (Memo, in Support of 
MSJ Against CIT at 3, Exhibit D to Memo, in Support of MSJ Against CIT, Addendum 
H) R. 222. 
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13. CIT discovered the Notice of Cancellation on or about November 9, 2004. 
(Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment against CIT at 3; Rule 
30(b)(6) Depo. of CIT at 29, Addendum B) R. 222. 
14. However, RJW Media had no knowledge of the Notice of Cancellation, and 
was unaware that the recorded Notice of Default had been removed. (Complaint at % 34; 
Depo. B. Parrish at 69, Addendum F) R. 6. 
15. On the reasonable belief that all procedural steps to foreclose on the 
Property had been taken, Blake Parrish, as new trustee of the IndyMac Trust Deed, issued 
a Notice of Trustee's Sale of the Property (the "Notice of Trustee's Sale") on November 
12, 2004. (Depo. B. Parrish at 74, Addendum F; Exhibit F to Memo, in Support of MS J 
Against CIT, Addendum I) R. 222. 
16. The Notice of Trustee's Sale stated that the Property would be sold to the 
highest bidder at a trustee's sale (the "Trustee's Sale"), to be held at the main entrance of 
the Summit County Courthouse on Monday, December 13, 2004 at 11:00 a.m. (Exhibit F 
to Memo in Support of MSJ Against CIT, Addendum I) R. 222. 
17. On November 16, 2004, RJW Media mailed notice of the Trustee's Sale to 
CIT. (Exhibit G to Memo, in Support of MSJ Against CIT, Addendum J) R. 222. 
18. On or about November 18, 2004, RJW Media's legal counsel mailed 
another letter (the "November 18th Letter") to CIT infomiing CIT that the Trustee's Sale 
12 
was noticed for December 13, 2004 and that RJW Media was willing to purchase CIT's 
trust deed in advance of the sale: 
My clients have purchased the $2.3 million Deed of Trust 
previously held by IndyMac and have noticed a foreclosure 
sale for December 13, 2004. It is our intention to conduct the 
foreclosure sale and clean off all encumbrances to the 
property. 
(Exhibit H to Memo, in Support of MSJ Against CIT, Addendum K) R. 
222-23. 
19. CIT received the November 18th Letter and understood that RJW Media 
intended to foreclose on the Property: 
Q: (by counsel for RJW) And so having received the 
[November 18th] letter, it was made clear to you that at least 
RJW's counsel intended to go ahead with this foreclosure 
sale, correct? 
A: It's - - yes, that's what they were telling me. 
(Rule 30(b)(6) Depo. of CIT at 44, Addendum B) R. 223. 
20. CIT thereafter made no attempt whatsoever to communicate to RJW Media 
that CIT viewed the Trustee's Sale as procedurally irregular. (Memo, in Support of MSJ 
Against CIT at 4; Rule 30(b)(6) Depo. of CIT at 42, 44, 53, Addendum B) R. 223. 
21. CIT did not attempt to enjoin the Trustee's Sale. (Memo, in Support of 
MSJ Against CIT at 4; Rule 30(b)(6) Depo. of CIT at 42, 44, 53, Addendum B) R. 223. 
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22. On December 13, 2004 at 11:00 a.m., RJW Media conducted the Trustee's 
Sale, and CIT deliberately elected not to attend the Trustee's Sale. (Memo, in Support of 
MSJ Against CIT at 4) R. 223. 
23. RTW Media was the highest bidder at the Trustee's Sale. (Memo, in 
Support of MSJ Against CIT at 4) R. 223. 
24. Immediately after the Trustee's Sale, CIT received notice that the Trustee's 
Sale had in fact occurred. (Rule 30(b)(6) Depo. of CIT at 54-55, Addendum B) R. 223. 
25. CIT did nothing to challenge or formally set aside the Trustee's Sale for 
months afterward. R. 223. 
26. Then, in April of 2005, CIT recorded a subsequent notice of default against 
the Property (the "CIT Notice of Default") and communicated its intent to conduct a 
trustee's sale of the Property. (Opp. to CIT MSJ re: Slander of Title at 6) R. 629. 
27. Although RJW Media requested that CIT remove the CIT Notice of Default 
from the record and insisted that CIT's interest in the Property had been extinguished, 
CIT refused to remove the CIT Notice of Default. (Opp. to CIT MSJ re: Slander of Title 
at 6) R. 629. 
28. Thereafter, CIT noticed a trustee's sale and began preparations to carry out 
that sale, despite the fact that RJW Media had conducted a trustee's sale and CIT had not 
obtained judicial invalidation of RJW Media's Trustee's Sale prior to attempting to re-
foreclose on the Property. (Memo in Support of Motion for TRO and Preliminary 
14 
Injunction at 4, Exhibit K to Memo, in Support of Motion for TRO and Preliminary 
Injunction) R. 60. 
29. RJW Media was forced to obtain a Temporary Restraining Order 
preventing CIT from conducting its trustee's sale. R. 93-94. 
30. On September 22, 2006, the trial court granted RJW Media's Motion for 
Summary Judgment against CIT, holding that CIT's interest in the Property was 
extinguished at RJW Media's December 13, 2004 Trustee's Sale of the Property and 
quieting title to the Property in RJW Media's favor. (Addendum L.) R. 493-510. 
31. Even after that September 22, 2006 Ruling and Order quieting title in RJW 
Media, CIT reftised to withdraw the CIT Notice of Default. (Opp. to CIT MSJ re: 
Slander of Title at 6) R. 629. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT FIRST 
SOUTHWESTERN DID NOT BREACH ITS DUTIES AS TRUSTEE TO 
RJW MEDIA AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
In cases involving claims of negligence and breach of duty on the part of trustees, 
summary judgment is inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care is "fixed by 
law" and reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the defendant's 
negligence under the circumstances. The applicable standard of care can become "fixed 
by law" only if a standard of care is set forth "as a matter of law by legislative enactment 
or prior judicial decision." First Southwestern failed to establish this element because at 
summary judgment, the trial court held that the Trust Deed Statute does not create a fixed 
at law standard of care for a trustee, and neither party argued at summary judgment that a 
judicial decision exists by which a trustee's duty has become fixed at law. The trial court 
should have denied summary judgment on this basis alone. 
In any event, reasonable minds could differ on the question of (1) exactly what 
standard of care applied to First Southwestern in this case, and (2) whether First 
Southwestern breached this standard of care. The Trustee Statute and case law on point 
clearly establish at least a minimum duty which runs from First Southwestern to 
beneficiaries such as RJW Media and to which trustees must adhere before canceling a 
notice of default. At a minimum, that duty is to act "reasonably and in good faith." 
Additionally, a trustee is expected to comply with the provisions of the trust deed and 
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adhere to the Trust Deed Statute. The Trust Deed Statute, Section 57-1-31 of Utah Code 
Annotated, indicates that a default must be cured and the trust deed reinstated as provided 
under 57-1-31(1) before a trustee is authorized to cancel a recorded notice of default 
RJW Media claimed in district court that First Southwestern breached its duty as a 
trustee to RJW Media by blindly recording the Notice of Cancellation at the instruction of 
Indymac, the former beneficiary, without obtaining the authorization of RJW Media, the 
current beneficiary, and without ensuring the underlying debt had been paid and the 
default had been cured. First Southwestern responded by submitting affidavits from two 
individuals who had experience in the title insurance industry (the "Affidavits"). 
The two Affidavits submitted by First Southwestern are wholly insufficient to 
enter judgment as a matter of law in First Southwestern's favor because these Affidavits 
do not establish the applicable standard of care to a trustee when recording a notice of 
cancellation of default and certainly do not establish that First Southwestern met the 
applicable standard of care as a matter of law. Even if accepted, the Affidavits do not 
establish that First Southwestern acted reasonably as a matter of law but merely establish 
that a trustee's failure to run a title report before recording the Cancellation does not 
constitute negligence per se. 
The facts, interpreted in a light most favorable to RJW Media, clearly indicate that 
First Southwestern breached the minimum standards contained in the Trustee Statute and 
case law setting forth a duty to act "reasonably and in good faith" because it is undisputed 
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that First Southwestern did nothing to obtain authorization from the current beneficiary of 
record, RJW Media, and did nothing to ensure that the debt underlying the trust deed in 
this case had been paid or that the default had been cured. Accordingly, reasonable 
minds could find that First Southwestem's complete failure to attempt to verify the Trust 
Deed Statute's requirements constitutes a breach of its duty as trustee. As a result, this 
case should be remanded to the trial court to allow a fact-finder to determine the duty 
owed by First Southwestern as trustee and whether First Southwestem's cancellation of 
the Notice of Default constitutes a breach of that duty. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RJW MEDIA COULD 
NOT ESTABLISH THE MALICE ELEMENT OF SLANDER OF TITLE AS 
A MATTER OF LAW AND ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF CIT. 
The trial court erred in at least two respects by granting summary judgment in 
CIT's favor on RJW Media's slander of title claim: (1) it refused to view the evidence 
and inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to RJW Media; and (2) it improperly 
took on the role of the trier of fact at the summary judgment stage and decided issues of 
credibility and intent without granting RJW Media the benefit of a trial on those material 
factual issues. 
CIT recorded the CIT Notice of Default after RJW Media's Trustee's Sale 
foreclosed on the Property. The presumption is that a trustee's sale is valid unless shown 
otherwise, and CIT knew that RJW Media conducted the Trustee's Sale. Despite that 
knowledge, CIT consciously decided not to challenge that sale or declare it procedurally 
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invalid before publishing the CIT Notice of Default. CIT is a $60 billion dollar company 
dealing exclusively in mortgages and foreclosures. R. 375. Given that CIT knew of the 
Trustee's Sale, had no actual interest in the Property when it published its statement and 
decided not to attempt to set aside the Trustee's Sale despite acting with the advice of 
legal counsel and being a sophisticated party in defaults and foreclosures, the trial court 
erred in holding that no reasonable trier of fact could find that CIT knowingly published a 
false statement and therefore could imply malice. 
Moreover, the trial court overstepped its well-defined boundaries at summary 
judgment by taking on the role of trier of fact, weighing the credibility of CIT's stated 
"belief that the CIT Notice of Default was proper, and determining the underlying intent 
of CIT in recording that Notice. These factual determinations should have been left to be 
made by the trier of fact at trial. CIT plainly had a motive to deny having any malicious 
intent in recording the CIT Notice of Default in order to avoid liability for slander of title. 
RJW Media should be allowed to question the CIT witnesses as to their motives, intent 
and beliefs in recording the CIT Notice of Default. An opportunity for a party to 
examine witnesses in open court before a trier of fact at trial is especially important in 
cases where the underlying intent of actions is at issue and where parties have a "motive 
to deny." 
Viewing the actual evidence presented in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
RJW Media has presented evidence that could show the existence of malice, particularly 
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implied malice, sufficient to preclude summary judgment. As a result, this case should 
be remanded to the trial court to allow RJW Media to present live testimony in open court 
at trial that CIT acted with implied malice in recording its Notice of Default. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT FIRST 
SOUTHWESTERN TITLE COMPANY DID NOT BREACH ITS DUTIES 
AS TRUSTEE TO RJW MEDIA AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. The Standard of Care That Applies to First Southwestern's Trustee 
Duties is not "Fixed by Law." 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of First Southwestern 
on RJW Media's negligence claim. "As a general proposition, summary judgment is 
inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on its merits, and should be employed only in 
the most clear-cut case." Wycalls v. Guardian Title of Utah 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). In cases involving claims of negligence and breach of duty on the part of 
trustees, "summary judgment is inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care is 
'fixed by law' and reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the defendant's 
negligence under the circumstances." Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 821 (quoting Elmer v. 
Vanderford, 445 P.2d 612, 614 (Wash. 1968) (emphasis added, citations omitted)). "Of 
particular concern is the precept that 'ordinarily, whether a defendant has breached the 
required standard of care is a question of fact for the jury.'" Id. (quoting Jackson v. 
Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982)). "Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that since summary disposition denies the losing party 'the privilege of trial,' art. I, 
§11 of the Utah Constitution suggests that 'doubt or uncertainty as to the questions of 
negligence . . . should be resolved in favor of granting . . . a trial." Id. (quoting Butler v. 
Sports Haven Int% 563 P.2d 1245, 1246 (Utah 1977)). 
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In this case, First Southwestern failed to establish that the applicable standard of 
care was "fixed by law." An industry standard of care can become "fixed by law" only if 
that standard of care is set forth "as a matter of law by legislative enactment or prior 
judicial decision." Id. The trial court concluded here that the standard of care as to 
trustees was not "fixed by law" because the "statutory provision . . . does not expressly 
purport to establish [a standard of care]." R. 526. The industry standard of care was not 
fixed at law by prior judicial decision in this case, as no party cited a prior judicial 
decision setting that standard. R. 522. 
Because the trial court concluded that the standard of care owed by a trustee to a 
beneficiary under a trust deed was not "fixed by law," the threshold for summary 
judgment suggested by Wycalis was not satisfied. Indeed, the trial court in this case 
should have issued the same decision as the Wycalis court and denied summary 
judgment. See Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 827 ("[the moving party] has not demonstrated that 
the standard of care owed by a trustee under a trust deed ... has been established in either 
of these ways. Thus, we are not convinced that the applicable standard has yet been 
established in Utah 'as a matter of law.'"). The standard of care owed by First 
Southwestern to RJW Media cannot "be established, as a practical matter, without a 
trial," and, like Wycalis, this case should be remanded to the district court for trial. 
Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 827. 
22 
In order to avoid a trial, the district court overreached and erroneously concluded 
that Wycalis "left the door open for the possibility that summary judgment may be 
appropriate where a case involved 'uncontroverted standard-of-the industry evidence.'" 
R. 528. But the Wycalis Court clearly set forth a two-prong standard for summary 
judgment: (1) the standard of care must be fixed by law and (2) reasonable minds cannot 
differ on whether a defendant was negligent under the circumstances. According to the 
Wycalis Court, if this standard cannot be met, "the standard must be established factually 
in the course of ultimate resolution of this case, with an emphasis on standard-of-care-in-
the-industry evidence." Id, at 826. Hence, Wycalis argues in favor of a trial, not against 
a trial. 
B. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist as to the Standard of Care that 
Applies to First Southwestern and Whether First Southwestern met 
that Standard of Care in this Case. 
Even if the Wycalis decision created an opening for a trial court to enter summary 
judgment in a negligence case involving a trustee, the trial court erred by overextending 
Wycalis in order to reach the conclusion that First Southwestern did not breach any duty 
to RJW Media as a matter of law. "A trial court may not grant summary judgment and 
thereby deny the plaintiff a trial on the negligence issue, including resolving the 
applicable standard of care, unless it correctly concludes that the jury could not 
reasonably find defendant's conduct to be negligent." Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 826. 
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Regardless of whether Utah's Trust Deed Statute contains complete instructions 
directing a trustee to carry out its duty, the Trust Deed Statute plainly contains minimum 
requirements as to what must occur prior to a trustee's cancellation of a notice of default, 
namely that a trustee is not authorized to cancel a notice of default until the debt 
underlying a trust deed has been paid and the default has been cured. See UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 57-1-31. Utah case law similarly establishes at least a minimum duty which runs 
from First Southwestern to beneficiaries such as RJW Media and to which trustees must 
adhere before canceling a notice of default. See First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. 
Banherry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1256 (Utah 1989) ("The existence of the trust itself 
creates a duty between the trustee and the beneficiary."). At a minimum, that duty is to 
act "reasonably and in good faith." Russell v. Lundberg, 2005 UT App 315, ^ 31, 120 
P.3d 541. Additionally, a trustee is expected to comply with the provisions of the trust 
deed and adhere to the Trust Deed Statute. See Five F, L.L.C v. Heritage Savings Bank, 
2003 UT App 373, 81 P.3d 105. 
Utah's Trust Deed Statute indicates that a default must be cured and the trust deed 
reinstated as provided under 57-1-31(1) before a trustee is authorized to cancel a recorded 
notice of default: 
If the default is cured and the trust deed reinstated in the 
manner provided in Subsection (1) ... the trustee shall 
execute, acknowledge, and deliver a cancellation of the 
recorded notice of default under the trust deed.... 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-31(2) (emphasis added). Section 57-1-21.5 of the Utah Code 
states that a trustee's "preparation and execution of ... (ii) the cancellation of notice of 
default and the election to sell" may not be delegated to another party. UTAH CODE ANN. 
§57-1-21.5. When reviewing the statutory requirements for a cancellation of notice of 
default, it should be kept in mind that a "trustee's primary obligation is to assure the 
payment of the debt secured by the trust deed." Russell, 2005 UT App 315 at *f 19. 
A fact-finder in the present case could reasonably conclude that First 
Southwestern failed to verify that the default had been cured and the trust deed had been 
reinstated before recording the Notice of Cancellation. It is undisputed that First 
Southwestern blindly cancelled the Notice of Cancellation based on a terse instruction 
from IndyMac, the former beneficiary and without authorization of RJW Media, the 
current beneficiary of record: 
Q. And how was the instruction [to record the Cancellation 
of Notice of Default] communicated to First Southwestern? 
Was it communicated in writing? 
A. Yes. 
* # * 
Q. Do you recall what that letter says generally? 
A. Please record Cancellation of Notice of Default. 
Q. Did it say anything else? 
A. No. 
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(Reply Memo, in Support of Summary Judgment Against First Southwestern at 3, Exhibit 
A to Reply Memo, in Support of MS J Against First Southwestern, Addendum G) R. 399. 
The fact finder could also reasonably conclude that First Southwestern owed a 
trustee's duty to RJW Media. Indeed, First Southwestern admits that as trustee, it owed 
an additional duty as trustee to RJW Media as the beneficiary of record: 
Q. And that First Southwestern does not have to perform 
an independent investigation? 
A. No, we don't. We're not being asked to issue title 
insurance, so, at that time. 
Q. But at that time you were a trustee, correct? 
A. We were a trustee. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. So you were not simply acting as a title 
research company, you were actually a trustee with regard to 
this particular Trust Deed? 
A. Yes. 
* * * 
Q. And that at least based on the records, First 
Southwestern's duty as trustee would run to RJW Media, Inc., 
not to IndyMac? 
A. (Pause) How do I answer that? I guess it would with 
the recorded documents, yes. 
(Reply Memo, in Support of MS J Against First Southwestern at 3; Exhibit A to Reply 
Memo, in Support of MS J Against First Southwestern, Addendum G) R. 399. 
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In a case where a trustee admits: (1) that it owed trustee duties to RJW Media; and 
(2) that it gave no thought to RJW Media when it recorded the Notice of Cancellation, 
RJW Media should be allowed to present evidence of that trustee's negligence to a finder 
of fact. 
C. The Affidavits Submitted by First Southwestern Do Not Qualify as 
Expert Witness Evidence of an Industry Standard of Care. 
The Wycalis decision emphasizes the important of expert witness testimony to 
establish an industry standard of care. Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 826, n.8. First Southwestern 
offered affidavits of Melvin Smith and Kathy Davis (the "Affidavits") to attempt to meet 
the Wycalis request for expert testimony. But the Affidavits do not constitute expert 
testimony. First Southwestern did not designate either Melvin Smith or Kathy Davis as 
an expert witness as required by the Civil Rules. See UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A); Pete 
v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, ^  15, 141 P.3d 629 (stating that an affidavit purporting 
to set forth an industry standard of care must be treated as expert testimony, and the 
affiant must have been so designated as a result); see also UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B); 
Pete, 2006 UT App 303 at f^ 12 (stating that expert testimony requires an expert report). 
An affidavit by an unidentified expert unfairly prejudices the opposing party, and should 
not be considered by the trial court as a result. Pete, 2006 UT App at f^ 18 (holding that 
an affidavit opposing summary judgment submitted by an unidentified expert was 
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properly excluded by the trial court). "Expert" affidavits submitted to support or oppose 
a motion for summary judgment must attest to specific facts as set forth in Civil Rule 56. 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 104 (Utah 1992) (stating that evidentiary rule 705's 
drafters "did not intend to exempt expert affidavits in opposition to summary judgment 
from rule 56(e)'s requirement that affidavits set forth specific facts ...."). As a result, 
"affidavits must include not only the expert's opinion, but also the specific facts that 
logically support the expert's conclusion. ... we stress the requirement that rule 56(e) 
requires specific facts." Id. (emphasis in original). 
The Affidavits of Melven Smith and Kathy A. Davis establish only that it is not 
unusual in their personal experience for "clients" to instruct trustees to cancel a Notice of 
Default, (Smith Aff. [^6; Davis Aff. at ^3) R. 311-16, and that in their personal experience 
a trustee does not exercise the diligence to search title before recording a Cancellation of 
Notice of Default (Smith Aff. Tf9; Davis Aff. at ^5). R. 311-16. These Affidavits do not 
even purport to set forth the complete standard of care applicable to trustees before 
l It is important that an opposing party receive expert disclosures because "the manner in 
which discovery is conducted concerning a fact witness and an expert is quite different." 
Id. at Tf 17. As the Utah Court of Appeals stated, 
Formal disclosure of experts is not pointless. Knowing the 
identity of the opponent ys expert witnesses allows a party to 
properly prepare for trial ... there are countermeasures that 
could have been taken that are not applicable to a fact 
witness, such as attempting to disqualify the expert testimony, 
retaining rebuttal experts, and holding additional depositions 
to retrieve the information not available because of the 
absence of a report. 
Id. {citing Musser v. Gentiva Health Svcs., 356 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis in 
original). 
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recording a Cancellation, and the Affidavits do not set forth specific facts that could 
support an opinion of an industry wide standard of care. 
First Southwestern cannot abrogate the minimum standards set forth by statute and 
case law by submitting affidavits from individuals who have not even been qualified or 
designated as experts in this case. Therefore, the Affidavits cannot provide a basis for 
granting summary judgment to First Southwestern on RJW Media's negligence claim. 
Put simply, a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to: (1) whether it was reasonable 
for First Southwestern to fail to obtain authorization from the current beneficiary of 
record to issue the Notice of Cancellation; and (2) whether it was appropriate for First 
Southwestern to disdain any effort to ascertain that the trust deed had been reinstated and 
the default cured prior to issuing the Notice of Cancellation. In light of these questions of 
facts and the lack of a fixed at law standard of care, a fact-finder could reasonably 
determine First Southwestern' conduct to be negligent, and RJW Media should be 
afforded the opportunity under the Utah Constitution's Open Court provision to present 
its negligence claim to a fact-finder at trial. See Wycalls, 780 P.2d at 826. Accordingly, 
this Court should remand this case to the trial court to determine at a trial the standard of 
care owed by a trustee, and whether First Southwestern breached that standard. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RJW MEDIA COULD 
NOT ESTABLISH THE MALICE ELEMENT OF SLANDER OF TITLE AS 
A MATTER OF LAW. 
The trial court erred in at least two respects by granting summary judgment in 
CIT's favor on RJW Media's slander of title claim: (1) it refused to view the evidence 
and inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to RJW Media; and (2) it improperly 
took on the role of the trier of fact at the summary judgment stage and decided issues of 
credibility and intent without granting RJW Media the benefit of a trial on those material 
factual issues. "Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon County, 805 P.2d 789, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Summary judgment is precluded when any material fact remains in dispute. See Agler v. 
Scheidle, 2006 UT App 495. Utah trial courts deciding summary judgment motions must 
"view all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party." Pugh v. Dozzo-Hughes, 2005 UT App 203, 1J 1 n.l, 112 P.3d 1247 (quoting 
Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98,1j 3, 104 P.3d 1208). Therefore, all facts and 
inferences as to RJW Media's slander of title claim must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to RJW as the non-moving party. Id. 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Holding That No Reasonable Fact-finder 
Could Determine That CIT Acted With Malice. 
In Utah, a slander of title claim consists of four elements: (1) publication; (2) a 
false, slanderous statement; (3) done with actual or implied malice; and (4) actual or 
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special damages. Bass v. Planned Management Svcs, 761 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1988). 
An actionable, slanderous statement with respect to property "is one that is derogatory or 
injurious to the legal validity of an owner's title or to his or her right to sell or 
hypothecate the property...." Id. RJW Media's slander of title claim is grounded in 
these facts: (1) CIT recorded a Notice of Default on the Property even though it knew 
RJW Media's Trustee's Sale of that Property already had occurred; (2) CIT refused to 
withdraw that Notice of Default after RJW Media asked CIT to do so and even after the 
trial court had quieted title of the property to RJW Media; (3) CIT published a statement; 
and (4) RJW Media suffered actual or special damages as a result of that publication. R. 
674. The trial court granted summary judgment to CIT on the ground that RJW's 
evidence of malice "was insufficient to merit the expense and time of a trial." R. 693-
694. 
Under well-established Utah precedent, a claimant may demonstrate the malice 
element of slander of title by showing implied malice. See First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A. 
v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Utah 1989) ("Malice may be implied where 
a party knowingly and wrongfully records or publishes something untrue or spurious or 
which gives a false or misleading impression adverse to one's title under circumstances 
that it should reasonably foresee might result in damage to the owner of the property."). 
Implied malice "does not require that it be affirmatively shown that the wrong was done 
with an intent to injure, vex or annoy, or because of hatred, spite or ill will." Howarth v. 
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Ostergaard, 515 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1973). In fact, a showing of "actual malice or ill 
will is unnecessary." Olsen v. Kidman, 235 P.2d 510, 513 (Utah 1951). "Malice may be 
implied where a party knowingly and wrongfully records or publishes something untrue 
or spurious or which gives a false or misleading impression adverse to one's title under 
circumstances that it should reasonably foresee might result in damage to the owner of 
the property." Banbeny Crossing, 780 at 1257. In further defining implied malice, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that the publisher of a disparaging statement takes the risk 
that the statement is untrue: 
It is not necessary that the publisher of a disparaging 
statement know or believe it to be false nor is it necessary that 
as a reasonable man he should know or believe that it is 
untrue. Furthermore it is immaterial that he has reasonable 
grounds for his belief in its truth. As an action for 
defamation, if the other essentials to liability are present, the 
publisher of disparaging matter takes the risk that it is untrue. 
0/^«, 235 P.2d at 513. 
In this case, it is undisputed that CIT published a false statement. CIT's Notice of 
Default was false because CIT did not have a legal interest in the Property at the time it 
filed its Notice. CIT refused to withdraw its false statement after RJW Media requested 
that CIT withdraw the Notice, and even after the trial court upheld RJW Media's 
Trustee's Sale and ruled that CIT's interest in the Property was extinguished. R. 510, 693. 
Therefore, CIT at the very least published its Notice of Default with reckless disregard 
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for the risk that the sale was valid and would be upheld, and CIT should be held 
accountable for its actions. See Olsen, 235 P.2d at 513. 
It also is undisputed that CIT knew about RJW Media's Trustee's Sale beforehand 
and that CIT deliberately chose not to take any action to attempt to declare the sale 
invalid before filing the CIT Notice of Default. R. 223. In Utah, a trustee's sale is 
presumed valid unless the sale's opponent produces evidence to the contrary. Timm v. 
Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, TJ 36, 86 P.3d 699; Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Svcs, 
Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1987); Occidential/Nebraska Fed. Savings Bank v. 
Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (stating that party opposing sale must 
produce sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of the sale's validity). The 
party seeking to set aside the sale bears the burden of producing evidence that notice 
defects or irregularities "would have the effect of chilling the bidding and causing an 
inadequacy of price." Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, ^ [ 36, 86 P.3d 699. 
CIT is a $60 billion dollar company dealing exclusively in mortgages and 
foreclosures. R. 375. CIT knew of RJW Media's pending Trustee's Sale and 
consciously chose to allow that Trustee's Sale to go forward. CIT then subsequently 
issued a notice of default as part of a scheme to cloud RJW Media's title and force RJW 
Media to capitulate to CIT's demands. Given these facts, it was error for the trial court to 
hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find that CIT knowingly published a false 
statement and therefore acted with implied malice. A reasonable fact-finder could 
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determine that a mortgage company with CIT's status and experience knew that the 
Trustee's Sale was presumed valid, that CIT knew that it had no legal right to file its CIT 
Notice of Default without first setting aside or challenging the Trustee Sale, and that CIT 
was wrongfully using a Notice of Default to gain leverage over RJW Media. As a result, 
genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to the malice element, and this case 
should be remanded for a trial on these issues. 
B. The Trial Court Improperly Assumed the Role of Trier of Fact at 
Summary Judgment. 
The trial court's ruling makes clear that it disregarded the injunction against 
resolving factual disputes as a trier of fact at the summary judgment stage. Indeed, the 
trial court viewed the evidence and inferences of that evidence in the light most favorable 
to CIT instead of RJW Media. This was error. "On summary judgment, the trial court 
must not weigh evidence or assess credibility, and where there are other equally plausible 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence, summary judgment should not have been 
granted." Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC v. Reott, 2007 UT App 223, Tj 35, 163 P.3d 713 
(citations omitted). "Moreover, on summary judgment, the trial court [is] required to 
construe doubts, uncertainties, or inferences concerning issues of fact in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment," which in this case was RJW Media. 
Bakowski, 2002 UT 62 at Tf 14. In addition, "[t]rial courts must exercise caution in 
granting summary judgment where tortious conduct is alleged," given the factual nature 
of these disputes. Richards Irrigation Co. v. Karren, 880 P.2d 6, 10 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1994)); see also Mumford v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 858 P.2d 1041 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (holding that where a trier of fact may or may not find tortious conduct on the part 
of a defendant, summary judgment is inappropriate). 
In its April 18, 2007 Ruling and Order, the trial court acknowledged that "the 
court must not weigh the credibility of evidence on a motion for summary judgment." R. 
690. However, the trial court overstepped its well-defined boundaries at summary 
judgment by taking on the role of trier of fact, weighing the credibility of CIT's stated 
"belief that its Notice of Default was proper, and determining the underlying intent of 
CIT in recording this Notice. R. 693. These factual determinations should have been 
made by the trier of fact after a trial. See, e.g., Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291, 1292 
(Utah 1978) ("Herein, although the parties were not in complete conflict as to certain 
facts, the understanding, intention, and consequences of those facts were vigorously 
disputed. These matters can only be resolved by a trial."). 
The trial court's factual determinations as to intent, credibility and consequence 
should not have been made prior to cross-examination of CIT. The in-court examination 
of a fact witness, and particularly a witness like CIT who possesses a motive to deny, is a 
critical part of fact finding: 
The words used are by no means all that we rely on in making 
up our minds about the truth of a question that arises in our 
ordinary affairs, and it is abundantly settled that a jury is as 
little confined to them as we are. They may, and indeed 
should, take into consideration the whole nexus of sense 
impressions which they get from a witness. ... Moreover, 
35 
such evidence may satisfy the tribunal, not only that the 
witness' testimony is not true, but that the truth is the 
opposite of his story; for the denial of one, who has a motive 
to deny, may be uttered with such hesitation, discomfort, 
arrogance or defiance, as to give assurance that he is 
fabricating, and that, if he is, there is no alternative but to 
assume the truth of what he denies. 
Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1952) (Learned Hand, J.); see also 
NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962); Aylett v. Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Dev. 54 F.3d 1560, 1566 (10th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, RJW Media is entitled to 
cross-examine CIT on its motivation for filing the CIT Notice of Default, and RJW 
Media has been deprived of that constitutional right. U.S. CONST, amend. VI; UTAH 
CONST, art. I, § 12. 
C. The Trial Court Failed to View the Evidence and Inferences From 
That Evidence in a Light Most Favorable to RJW Media. 
The trial court was required to "view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Bakowski, 2002 UT 62 at 
f 14. But after first recognizing that RJW Media possessed "colorable" evidence of 
malice by CIT, the trial court then concluded that the evidence was "insufficient to merit 
the expense of a trial." R. 693-94.2 A party's constitutional right to confront witnesses 
2 The trial court held: 
"[T]he legal issues are not such that CIT could reasonably be found to have 
acted cavalierly or with any implied malice. . . . Plaintiffs claim is indeed 
'colorable5 but not sufficient to this court that this court believes a 
reasonable fact finder (this court) could find the filing of the notice was 
with malice, express or implied. . . . [E]ven though intent is a question of 
36 
and try its case is not contingent upon economical considerations. Constitutional rights 
are absolute. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
RJW Media has presented evidence that could show the existence of malice, particularly 
implied malice, sufficient to preclude summary judgment. As a result, this case should 
be remanded to the trial court to allow RJW Media to present live testimony in open court 
at trial that CIT acted with implied malice in recording its Notice of Default. 
fact, the court believes the evidence presented by plaintiff is insufficient to 
merit the expense and time of a trial to repeat that same evidence and 




For the reasons stated and authority cited supra, Appellant RJW Media 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Summary Judgment granted to First 
Western and CIT, respectively, by the district court and remand this case to the district 
court with instructions to allow RJW Media the opportunity to prove its factual case at 
trial before a fact finder in open court. 
Respectfully Submitted this 24th day of September, 2007. 
WRONA LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
Joseph E. Wrona 
Bastiaan K. Coebergh 
Tyler S. Foutz 
Attorneys for Appellant/Cross Appellee RJW Media, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of September, 2007,1 caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be delivered via first class mail, postage 
pre-paid, to: 
Dana T. Farmer 
SMITH KNOWLES 
4723 Harrison Blvd, Ste. 200 
Ogden,UT 84403 
Mark S. Middlemas 
Castle, Meinhold & Stawiarski 
102 West 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
39 
ADDENDA 
Fixed Rate Note A 
Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition Transcript of CIT Group/Consumer Finance, Inc. 
by Roy Stringfellow B 
Notice of Default C 
Note Purchase and Sale Agreement D 
Commitment for Title Insurance E 
Deposition Transcript of Blake Parrish F 
Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition Transcript of Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, 
Inc. by Nancy L. Blanco G 
Cancellation of Notice of Default H 
Notice of Trustee's Sale I 
Letter to CIT Group from Wrona & Parrish, dated November 16, 2004 J 
Letter to CIT Group from Wrona & Parrish, dated November 18, 2004 K 
Ruling and Order, dated September 22, 2006 L 
Ruling and Order, dated April 18, 2007 M 
40 
Tab A 
t I uiiririUiM/w 
FIXED RATE NOTE 
(Coastruction-To-Permaneat Loan) 
Loan*CTP- 885938 
JANUARY 19, 2001 PASADENA CALIFORNIA 
iCiiy] Suite 
2350 WEST RED PINE COURT 
PARK CITY. UT 84098 
[Propeny Address] 
X. BORROWER'S PROMISE TO PA\ 
la return for a kun thai I have received, I promise iu pay U.S. $ 1 , 9 0 0 , 0 0 0 . ( 0 or so uuch uf such feum as 
has been advanced to mc (Ohs amount is called "principal"), plus interest, to the order of t e Leudc \ The Lcnddr U 
INDYMAC BANK, F.S.B. 
a federally chartered savings bank 
I understand that the Lender may transfer Uiis Note. The Under or anyone who take* this Note by transfer and ^ho is 
eniitlecj to receive payments under Uiis Note is called die "Nutc Holder." 
The luan will be advance4 to me pursuant to a Construction Loan Agreement betv sen die .ender and md (the 
"Construction Loan Agreement"). The period of time commencing on the date of this Not and cn« mg un the last day of 
die month in which die "Completion Date" under die Construction Loan Agreement occur; is icfen :d to herein al the 
"Construcuun Period." The first day ot die first month after die Completion Date uccurs i referred 10 herein as Ale 
"Permanent Loan Couuncucemcnt Date." The period of time commencing on the Pennant it Loan rommenceme]|ti Date 
and ending on the Mammy Date described below is referred to herein as the "Permanent L >an Pen. ,d." The 
Construction Period Rider attached hereto sets forth certain terms applicable to this Note d <riug the Construction (Period 
only. After die Construction Period, that Rider shall no longer apply and this Note may b» trausfci red wiuVnu tfiki 
Rider attached hereto. The expiration of the Construction Period may be evidenced by die Note He ider's endorsement of 
die Permanent Loan Commencement Date hereon, as permitted below. At any time on or ftcr the 'ermanenj Lu«jn 
Commencement Date, I hereby audiorize the Note Holder to endorse upon tbb Note a cert, ication wring die 
Completion Date, die Permanent Loan Commencement Pate, die Maturity Date, the princi ml balai :e ot my loan bn the 
Permanent Loan Commencement Date, me amount of my mondily payment during the Pen uinem L Jan Pcrmd, anp me 
momh in which the monthly payments due hereunder during the Permanent Loan period <u to com nence. Any 
subsequent Note Holder shall be entitled tu rely un such periifrcauou. 
2, INTEREST 
Interest will be citarged on unpaid principal until the full amount of principal adva iced to i ie has been pi 
During the Permanent Loan Period and thereafter unul 1 repay the loan in full, 1 will pay h tercet at a yearly rate o; 
9.500%. 
The interest rate required by this Section 2 is the rate I will pay bodi before and al cr any d :f4Ulr described" iu 
this Note 
3. PAYMENTS 
(A) Time and Place of Payments 
During the Permanent Loan Period, 1 will pay principal and interest by w Utiii^  pa oncuk every nijmh. 
During the Permanent Loan Period, I will make my monthly payments or die firsi day of each radnth 
begimhug ouc raoudi arier the Permanent Loan Commencement Date. I will make diese pa uuents c /ery month until I 
have paid all ut" the principal and interest and any odier charges described below thai 1 may -)we unu ;r \i\h Note. My 
monthly payments will be applied to interest before principal. If, on die date which is 30. years after ttje 
Permanent Loan Commencement Date, I sull owe amuunu; under this Note, I will pay dtos amount, in full on that (date, 
which is caJled die "Maturity Date." 
I will maKe my monthly payments at 
155 NORTH LAKE AVENUE 
PASADENA, CA 91101 
or at a different place if required by die Note Holder. 
(B) Amount Of My Monthly Payments 
During die Permanent Loan Period, me amount of my mondily payment I ill be ca culated as of d*J 
Permanent Luan Commencement Date to equal die amount of the mondily pay mem that wo dd be SL fficiem to repay die 
unpaid principal dial 1 owe at die Permanent Loan Commencement Date in full on the Maa ity Dan. at die interest r|te 
set forth in Section 2 of this Note in substantially equal payments. 
^S-917 - i - F< rm UNMC 917 
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(C) Notice of Cliangc* 
TJic Note Holder will deliver or mail to me a notice of any change* m th-: ainoun of my mondlly 
payment beiorc me effective U«u: of die clumge. The notice will include information rcqu red by 1. w to be givci me and 
also die title and telephone number of a person whu will answer any qucbtions 1 may have 'cgardiu; die ooucc 
4. INTENTIONALLY DELATED 
5. BORROWER'S RIGHT TO PREPAY 
1 have die right to make payments of principal at any time before they art due. fi payrncn uf principal buly is 
known as a "prepayment." When 1 make a prepayment, i will tell die Note Holder in writ ug that am doing so] 
I will make a full prepayment or partial prepayment* without paying any prcpayn mt char; e. The Noteholder 
will use all of my prepayments to reduce the amount of principal mat I owe under tills Nu\:. If 1 n ake a partial 
prepayment, there will be no changes in die due dates on my monthly payments unless the Note He tder agrees in|wriiing 
to tliose changes. 
6. LOAN CHARGES 
If a law, which applies to diis lo4n and which sets maximum loan charges, is ftna y intern -eted so that ttc 
interest or other loan charges collected or to be collected in connection wilh ihia loan exec, d the pe mined limiu, dicn: 
(i) any such loan clungc shall be reduced by the amount necessary to reduce the charge to i ie permi ted limit; and(ii) any 
stun* already collected from me which exceeded permitted limits will be refunded to me. ' he Note Holder may cjhoose 
to make the refund by reducing the principal I owe under dib Note or by making a direct j *ymcru i D me. If a rediud 
reduces principal, the reduction will be treated as a partial prepayment, 
7. BORROWER'S FAILURE TO PAY AS REQUIRED 
(A) Late Charges for Overdue Payments 
If the Note Hulder has not received die full arnouut of any monthly payment by it r end or" 
FIFTEEN calendar days after die date it ib due, I will pay a late chaige to me 1 ote Hoi let. The amuilm of 
the charge will be 5 .000 % of my overdue payment of principal and interest. 1 will pa this iaf charge promptly but 
only once on each late payment. 
(B) Default 
If I do not pay the full amount of each monthly payment on die date it is due, I wi I be in c rfauit 
(C) Notice of Default 
If I am in default, die Note Holder may send me a written notice telling me diat it 1 do not p*y the overdue 
amount by a certain date, the Note Hulder may require me to pay immediately die full amt mt of pi ncipal which lias not 
been paid and all the interest that 1 owe on that amount. That date must be at least 30 day; after the date on whichjthe 
notice is delivered or mailed to me. 
(D) No Waiver by Note Holder 
Even if, at a time when 1 am in default, die Note Holder does not require me to p; / immec lately in full a^  
described above, the Note Holdci will still have die right to do so if I am in default at a lat r time. 
(E) Payment of Note Holder's Costs and Expenses 
If the Note Holder has required me tu p4y immediately in full as described above, ht Nou Holder will halve the 
right to be paid back by me for all uf its costs and expenses in enforcing this Note to the o cut nut )ruhibited by 
applicable ldw. Those expenses include, for example, reasonable attorneys' fees. 
8. GIVING OF NOTICES 
Unless applicable law requires a different mediod, any notice dwr must be given ti me und :r this Note will be 
given by delivering it or by mailing it by first class mail to me at the Property Address abo 'c or at, different addrjss if I 
give the Note Holder a notice of ray different address. 
Any nonce dun must be given to the Note Hulder under this Note will be given b) mailing it by first class friaU 
to die Note Holder at the address stated in Section 3(A) above or at a differeut address it" I m given a nonce of that 
different address. 
9. OBLIGATIONS OF PERSONS UNDER THIS NOTE 
If more than one person si^ns tub Noic, each person is fully and personally obligi ed w kc :p all of die promises 
made in this Note, including the promise to pay the full amount owed Any persott who fa es over hese obligation! is 
also obligated to keep all uf the promises made in this Note. The Note Holder may enforct its righi i wider diis Noil 
against each person individually ur against all uf ns togcUicr. This means that any one of u . may be required to pay |all 
of die amounts owed under diis Note. 
DDS-917 -2- h.«nlNMC<H7 
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10, WAIVERS 
1 and any other person who has obligations under this Note waive die rights of pi rsentmci t and notice ofI 
dishonor. "'Presentment" meau> die right to requiie die Note Hulder 10 demand payment. f amour & due. nNou<4 of 
dishonor" means the right 10 require die Note Holder to give notice tu other persons that \ nouots» ue h4Vc not befcu 
P4id. 
11. UNIFORM SECURED NOTE 
Tliis Note is based upon a uniform instrument with limited variations iu some jur sdiction . In addition nj» die 
protections given to the Note Holder under tins Note, a Mortgage, Deed of Trust or Secui ty Deed (the "Security 
Instrument"), dated the some date as diis Note, protects die Note Holder from possible Kb ci, whic i might result id I do 
not keep die promises which 1 make in diis Note. That Security Instrument describes how and und r what conditions 1 
umy be required to make immediate payment in full of all amounts 1 owe under dns Note. Some o those conditions arc 
described a^  follows: 
Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest In Borrower, if all r wry p, rt of the Properly or 
any interest in it is sold or transferred (or if 4 beneficial interest in Borrower is Sv d or ua isfcrred and BoJrowcr 
is luji a natural person) without Lender's prior written consent, Lender may, at it. option, tcquire immediate 
payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument. However, this 0; tion sua i not be e^ercisfd by 
Lender if exercLe U prohibited by federal law as of die date of this Security Instr ment, 
if Lender exercises the option to require immediate payment iu full, Lqi> cr shall jjvc Borrower iloticc 
of acceleration The notice ^hall provide a period of not less Uian 30 days from t l : date if * notice is dchvtrcd 
or mailed widiin which Borrower must pay all suras secured by thi* Security Insti imenc. f Borrower fails to 
pay Uiese sums prior to die expiration of this period. Lender may invoke any rem- dies per nittcd by Uiis Sqcurity 
Instrument widiom further notice or demand on Borrower. 
ALAN SQUIRES Z 
6^-
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I I u m ' l H U i M r 
CONSTRUCTION PERIOD RIDER 
TO 
ADJUSTABLE QR FIXED RATE NOTE 
(Constructton-To-Permanent Loan) 
THIS CONSTRUCTION PERIOD RIDER ("Rider") is dated JANUARY 1 9 , 2QQ1 anji is 
incorporated into and shall be deemed tu amend and supplement die Adjustable Rate Note (G astructjt. n-To-Pcrmaukni Loan) ur 
Fixed Rate Note (Coasii\»ction-To-Pennancni) (die "Note"), dated *> of JANUARY 1 9 , 2C U given by |he 
undersigned in favor of INDYMAC BANK, F . S , B . 
a federally chartered savings bank , the um^i1awed dierem| AU 
capitalized tenu> used but uot defined herein shall have the meanimjb set funh in. die Noic, 
This Rider shall apply only during die Construction Period and shall nu longer apply 11 or aftc die Permanent Loan 
Commencement Dale. 
Tlie undersigned hereby agrees 43 fulluws: 
1. THE CONSTRUCTION LOAN AGREEMENT 
The Contraction Loan Agreement sets fonh ceii4in of my obligations and ccitain dcf« dts whii h will entide \ht Noie 
Holder iu require roc to mak* immediate payment in full of die loan. 
2 . LENGTH OF CONSTRUCTION PERIOD 
in no event shall die Coastruction Period exceed 12 mondis; if it docs, l will be in d fault un kr die Note unless 
excused by die Note Holder ur extended pursuant to die Construction Loan Agreement. 
3 . INTEREST 
During the Construction Period. I will pay interest at a yearly rate of 9 . 5 0 0 %. 
The interest rate required by this Section 3 is die rate I will pay during d»e Coustruccic 1 Period bod) before arid after any 
default described m die Note, except as set form in die Consirucriun Loan Agrcemem with ic pcci 10 1 ic interest changeable 
after certain defaults during the Construction Period, 
*, PAYMENTS 
(A) Tune of Payments 
I will pay interest payments every month during die Construction Period, in a amoum equal to die ir|tcrcsi 
which has accmed ou die unpaid principal during the prior mown. 
I v/ill make my monthly payments on die first day of each inondi beginning o« die firsi u*y of die first month 
following die initial disbursement under the Construction Loan Agreement. My monthly pay aents WJ I be applied tq interest 
before principal. 
(B) Monthly Payment Changes 
Changes hi my monthly payment will reflect changes in die principal amounts idvancc \ during die Construction 
Period. The Nutc Holder will detcrmiue die changed amount of my mondily payment in accc "dance v ub the Cunstnlctiun Loan 
Agreement. 
5. OTHER NOTE PRQVJSIONS APPLY 





FORM ^NMC 91U 
IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. 
3465 E. Foothill Blvd. 2nd Floor 
Pasadena, California 91107 
ATTN: HOME CONSTRUCTION LENDING 
INDYMAC Loan #CTP:885938/RTP1551748 
PARCEL I.D.# See Legal 
(Space Above This Line For Recording Data) 
LOAN MODIFICATION AGREEMENT 
Fixed30 No P r e p a y m e n t Penal ty 
Th is Loan Modif ica t ion Agreement ("Agreement") made the Wednesday , March E0, 
2002 be tween Alan Squi res and , A M A R R I E D MAN AS HIS SOLE AND SEPARATE 
P R O P E R T Y ("Borrower"), and IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. formerly INDYMAC MORTGAGE 
HOLDINGS, INC., A Delaware Corporation ("Lender"), amends and supplements (1) the Mortgige, 
Deed of Trust or Security Deed (the "Security Instrument") dated March 17, 2002 and recorded on as 
Instrument No. in the OFFICIAL Records of SUMMIT county the state of UT, and (2) the Note beading 
the same date as, and secured by, the Security Instrument which covers the real and personal property 
described in the Security Instrument and defined therein as the "Property" located at: 2350 NW Red l|me 
Court, Park City, UT 84098. 
See Exhibit "A" Legal description attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
hi consideration of the mutual promises and agreements exchanged, the parties hereto agree as follows 
(Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Note of Security Instrument): 
1) As of the conversion from the Construction Phase to the Permanent Phase of the loan the amount 
payable under the Note and Security Instrument (the "Unpaid Principal Balance") will be 
U.S. $1,900,000.00 No/100. Excluding any interest owing to date. 
2) The Borrower promises to pay the Unpaid Principal Balance, plus interest, to the order of the Lender. 
Interest will be charged on the Unpa id Pr inc ipa l Ba lance at the yearly rate of 7.625% frpm 
April 1, 2002. The Borrower promises to make monthly payments of principal and Interest of LI.S. 
$13,448.08 beginning on May 1, 2002, and continuing thereafter on the same day of each succeeding 
month until principal and interest are paid in full. If on April 1, 2032 (the "Maturity Date"), the 
Borrower still owes amounts under the Note and Security Instrument as amended by this Agreement, 
the Borrower will pay these amounts in full on the Maturity Date. 
3) If all or any part of the Property or any interest in it is sold or transferred (or if a beneficial interest in 
the Borrower is sold or transferred and the Borrower is not a natural person) without the Lender's 
prior written consent, the Lender may, at its option, require immediate payment in full of all sups 
secured by this Security Instrument. 
4) If the Lender exercises this option, the Lender shall give the Borrower Notice of Acceleration. Tfhe 
notices shall provide a period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice is delivered or mailed 
within which the Borrower must pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If the Borrower 
fails to pay these sums prior to the expiration of this period, the Lender may invoke any remedies 
permitted by this Security Instrument without further notice or demand on the Borrower. 
5) The Borrower also will comply with all other covenants, agreements, and requirements of ihe 
Security Instrument, including without limitation, the Borrower's covenants and agreements to make 
all payments of taxes, insurance premiums, assessments, escrow items, impounds, and all otlker 
payments that the Borrower is obligated to make under the Security Instrument; however, the 
following terms and provisions are forever canceled, null and void, as of the date specified!in 
paragraph No. 1: 
Squires/885938/1551748/03/20/02/2:12 PM 
5) Cont 
a) all terms and piovisions of the Note and Security Instrument (if any) providing for 
implementing, or relating to any change 01 adjustment m the late of interest payable ujider the 
Note 
b) and all terms and provisions of any adjustable late ndei oi othei instiument 01 documerjt that is 
affixed to, wholly oi paitially incorporated into, or is part of, the Note or Secuiity Instrument 
and that contains any such terms and piovisions as those referred to in (a) above 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be understood 01 constiued to be satisfaction or release m whole oi in part 
of the Note and Security Listrument Except as otheiwise specifically provided in this Agreement, t, 
and Secuiity Instrument will lemam unchanged, and the Bonower and Lendei will be bound b) 
with, all of the terms and piovisions thereof, as amended by this Agieement 
be Note 
[comply 
BY SIGNING BELOW, Bonowei accepts and agrees to the terms and covenants contained! m this 









Its Team Manager 
Old Loan Number 885938 
New Loan Numbei 1551748 
Squires/885938/l551748/03/20/O2/2 12 PM 
5, The land referred to in this Conunilmcnl is described os follows: 
Uil 3, DUTCH DRAW AT CANYON ESTATUS SUBDIVISION, Park Cily, Utah, according to tlic ofllcial plat Hereof on file in 
lliu ulTicc of the Summit County Recorder. 
Property Address: 
2350 WP.ST RP.D 1'INli COURT 
PARK. CITY, UTAH K4060 
TIILS COMMITMENT VALID ONLY IF COVER AND SCHEDULE D ARE ATIACIH3D. 
,01/18/2004 14:48 FAX ^ 
13. Loan Charges, if die loan secured by mis Security Instrument is subject to a law v ukh sen maximum loan chargbsT 
and diat law Li finally interpreted so thai the interest or odier loan charges collected or 10 be ollcacil in uonn:cnon with ihfc 
loan exceed Uxc permitted limits, them (a) any such loan charge shall be reduced by the aim. mt nccc salty to reduce ihc charge 
co the permitted limit; and lb) any sums already collected from Borrows which exceeded pe milted 1 mils will be rerundcd|to 
Bomiwa. Leader may choose »o make this rerund by reducing ibe principal owed under the Nuur or by making a direct 
payment to Borrower. If * refund reduces principal, die reduction will be treated as a pamria. prepay! &w whhoui any 
prepayment vhar^e under die Note. 
14. Notice*. Any JUHJLC to Borrower provided for m this Security ljisrrumcut shall be i ivew by klivenug it or by mailing 
ic by fuw cla*> mail unless applicable kw requires use of another iuethod. The notice Jball 1 c dixeeu 4 to the Property Address 
or any outer address Borrower designates by notice to -Lender. Any notice to Lender shall b given t i iarsr class mail to 
Lender's address auued herein or any other address Lender designates by notice tu Borrower Any a rice provided for in i|Us 
Security Instrument shad be deemed to have beem given to Borrower or Lender when given t : provid d in tbi* paragraph. 
15. Governing Lwr Severability. This Security instrument sruUl he governed by fedc al law a id dV kw of the jurisdiction in which the Prvpcrry is located. In the event that any provkjon ur clause of mi Securir Insmuncrir or the Note 
conflicts wiih applicabk law, such conflici shall not affout odier provisions uf this Security i isnumcr r or ihe Note which dau be 
given effect without die conflicting provision. To uus end die provisions uf uiij Security III: jrument ma ihe Mote are decked 
to be severable, 
16. Borrower's Copy. Borrower shall be given One conformed copy Of the Note and u this Scv urity Instrument. 
17. Transfer vf the Property or a Beneficial lnierwt Ui Borrower. If all or any part if the Pi jpcrty i,»r any lmcreal in it 
is sold or ujanstexjccl (oi it' a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or nan f^crrrd and Baxrm cr in no. a rwuaal person) wipiout 
Lender's prior written cou*mt. Lender may. at its option, require immediate payment m full of all su iw secured by uik 
Security Ir^rrumcm. However, this option, shall not be exercised by Lewder if exercise is pr. hibiwd »y federal kw as of tjle 
dare of thib Security Instrument. 
If Lender exercises ibis option, Lender shall give Borrower noucc of avxclcration. lie notit c shall provide a period of 
not less dian 30 days from the date the notice is delivered or mailed within which Borrower mst pay all sums secured by this 
Sccuriry insmjineni. If Borrower fails 10 pay these sums prior to the expiration of this perio I, Ltndss • may ioyoks any remedies 
permitted by dus Security luspruniem without furdier notice or demand on Borrower, 
18. Borrower's Right ID Reinsure. If Burrowcr racer* ceruin comlraons, Borrower si »!) have dte ri^u \o have 
enforcement uf diis Security ln»muncnt diaconrinucd at any rime prior ui die earlier of: (a) 5 days (oi such other period 44 
applicable k w may specify for reinstatement) before ^alc of die Property pursuant to any po> er of sa c uonuiined in this 
Security Instrument; or (bj entry ot a judgment tuforcuig this Security Insuumeut. Those ct ndidons are that Borruwcr: 
(4) pays Lender all sums which then would be due under diis Security Instrument and the Nc e as if u J acedcrauon had 
occurred; (b) euro any defaub of any othci covenants or agreements; (c) pays all expenses h curxed i i eufbrcing dus Sccvkity 
Instrument, including, but nut limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees; and (d) lakes such actio i as Len ler may reasonably iquirc 
to assure diat me hen of thb Security Instrument, Lenders rights iu die Property and ikmo\ er'^ obi gation to pay the swp^ 
secured by tfiis Securiry Insuumenr >haJl continue unchanged. ^ P ° n reinswemeut by Borro /er, 0 i s Secujify Insrrumcnt Bud 
die obligauons secured hereby shall remain fully effective as if no acceleration had occurred Howev :ir, ibis right to rc-in^aie 
shall not apply id die case of acceleration under paragraph 17 above. 
19. Sale or Note; Change of -Lotto Servicer. The Note or a partial interest in the Note Uogethe - widi (his Security 
Insmnncni) may be *44 our or more times wimour prior notice to Borrower. A sale may re alt In a Mange in die entity 
(known as the "Loaa Servicer") dnu collects monthly payments due under the Jtoic and diis. ccmiry iisuumcut. Theie also 
may be one or more change* of die Loan Servicer unrelated to a sale of the Note. If there is »changt of the Loan Servicer, 
Borrower will be fliven wriuea oouce of the change in accordance widi paragraph 14 mbove i od apph ^bk law. The notile will 
sate die name and address of die ucw Loan Servicer and the address to which payment shoul I be mat e. The notice will 4lso 
contain any other infonnatiou required by applicable law, 
20. Hazardous Substances, Borrower shall not cause or permit die presence, U3it» Oisp »sal. sw i^e, or release of aiiy 
Hazardous Subsomco on or in die Property. Borrower shall not do, nor allow anyone else t • do. anj cuing affecdnfi ule 
Propeiry thai b in viokdon of any Environmental Law. The preceding two sentences shall 1 21 apply to die picseuce, usd, or 
storage on die Property of small quantirica of Hazardous Substances mat are generally recog uzed to >e appropriate w no t^ual 
residential uses and to maintenance of the Property. 
INMCff9lZ.POC .5- f ORM IrfMCj 912UT 
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Borrower stall promptly give leader written node* of auy investigation, dairui da mid, la\ 'suit or other action w any 
governmental or regulatory agency or privale party involving the Property and stay Itairdoi'»Substa >c<> ox EuviroruneundLaw 
of which. Borrower b « actual knuwlt^c. If Buixower learns, Of is notified by any governni -mal or eguktoj7 authority, that 
any removal or other remediation of any Hazardous Substance affecting th£ Property is nece: iary. flQ Tower shall promptly take 
all necessary remeolal actions in accordance with Envrjunnwriud Law. 
As used in this paragraph 20, "Hazardous Substances" are those substances defined * roue • r hazardous substancts by 
Brrvironmcoial Law and the following substances: gasoline, kerosene, other flammable writ pctralei m products, tox'u 
pesticides and herbicides, vuUtile solvents ax nwcriaU containing asbestos or formaldehyde ind radii ncidve naaterials. As Lsed 
in this paragraph 20, "£nviionrnemal Lawr means federal laws and laws of the jurisdicpon \ here the Property is located tijai 
relate to hcahb, Safety or eoYU-oomental protection. 
NON-UNIFOKM COVENANTS, borrower and Under furti*ei cpytuant and agre : as toll* wy. 
21. Acceleration; Remedies. Lender stall give aurice to Borrower prior to acccleratioj follow! ifi Borrower's breach of 
any uovcnaiu or agreement in this Security IrjsLrurncm (bur not prior to acceleration uod>r p<» aferaph 7 abovo unless applicable 
Uw provides ntherwise) The notice shall specify: la) the default; (b) die action requited to :ure the letfault; (c) a date, not less 
than 30 days from die date die nodes is given tu Borrower, by which the default raiw be cut d; aud (1) diat failure to cure we 
default un ur before the date specified in the notice may result in acceleration of die sums sc\ orcd by hi:* Seowiry lastrumcU 
and sale D£ die Property. Tlie notice shall further inform Borrower of die right to reinstate u ter accel ration »nd die right lo 
bring a court action 10 assert the non-existence of a default or any other defense of Borrower UJ avwlt uuon and sale, if iht 
dcfcmk is not cured on or before the date specified in die notice. Lender at its option may ret aire ims .etlian? payment in M of 
all turns secured by this Security Iusrrmrient witiiout timber demand and may invoke die po\ er of sa) ? and auy other raocilies 
pennincd by applicable low. Lender *}i«ll be euadc4 tf> collect all o^peaies incurred jn. purs iip$ (be cmccUes provided in this 
paragraph 2lr including, but nor limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of dins evtcl* nee. 
If Leuder invokes ihv power uf sale, Lender »uall execute or cause Trustee io excen -- a wrin aj police of the occurtenLe 
of an event or de&ult and of Lender'* election \u cause the Property to be sold. Trustee: sfcal cause t aj uudce to be recotopd in 
each county in which any p^n of the Propcny is located. Leader or Trustee shall mall copk of the i otice us picscribed ra 
applicable law to Borrowex and io die other persons prescribed by appllcaDle h»w. Trustee s. all give atfMii: iiuqee of sale to die 
persons and in die maimer prescribed by applicable law. After the time required by applicar * law, 1 rusn«, without demand; on 
Borrower, ihall sell the Property at puhlic auction to die highest bidder at the inne and place and und s «hc terms designate!! in 
ihc notice of sale in one ur more parcel* and in any order Trustee determines. Trustee may ] kbtpone iale of JUI or any parurl uf 
the Propeny by public umu>uncemcnt &t uV time and place of any previously scheduled sale n die m niicr allowed hy law. 
Lender or i« (jfiilgnsB may purchase the Property at any sale-
Trustee shall deliver to the purchaser a Trustee's deed conveying the Property widn. at any c fvenam <.«r warr^nr), 
expressed or uuplied- The rcuiuds in die Trustee's deed ahall be prima facie evident of \i»r ruth uf he suitcroents nude 
UicreiiL Trustee shall apply the proceeds of th? sale in die following order: (a) to the cost:! nd expc urns uf exercising the 
power of sale and of the sale, including die payment of the trustee's and attorneys7 fees HCRU ily incw red not to exceed uV 
amuum which may be provided for in tbc Security msrrurncm; (b) to payment of die obligan ins sceu al by iSu» Security 
Instrument; and (c) the balance, if »ny, w die person or persons legally eiiritlod thereto. 
22. J»ec4jnveyance. Upon p«ymcnt of al| sums secured py mis Security Irisrrumeru, Lc. dcr shal nwiuo't Trustee to 
reconvey in* Property and shall surrender diis Security Instrumenr and all notes evideming t ^bt sccu ed by diii Sccuriry itltercsi 
to Trusiec. Tru>tee shall reconvey die Prupcrry widiout warraniy and without charge to the «crsun o persons legally cunujed to 
it. Such person or persons shall p*iy any recordanou costs. 
23. Substitute Trustee. Lender, at ire option, may from time to time appoint a succ<tf3 ii trus^ to arry Trustee apposed 
hereunder by an insrruincnt executed and acjmowleqged by Lender and recorded in Che oftiet of me $ ecoraei of the county) in 
whicli the Property is lovated. The insorumeait shall contain die name of the original Lender Trustee and -Bojnrowcr, me o i lc 
and p^ge where this Secunry Insirurnebt it recorded and the name and address of die success <r trustee. Without couYcyauqe of 
die Propeny, the succcrwx rnurec ^hall recced to all me tide, puwna and duties conferred ipon me Trustee nerein and bv 
applicable Uw. 
24. Rjequesu far Notices- Borrower requests that copies of the notices of default *nd s le be se it to Borrower^ address 
which is di= PTupexry Address. 
hood ChmjurTrt*ki 
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25. Riders lo inJs Securliy Instrument. If one or more riders are e*ecmed by Borrow r awl re urded whether with tfiik 
Seomry Insiruiwcw, tlie covenants turf agreements of each, iuch rider snail be incorporated ij to and s vaii unicnii and supplenpu 
tne covcD»nb and ajirsraenu of dris Security Instrument a* if the ridcr^) were part of this S curiry 1 diruraeni 
iCbecK applicable box^s)} 
| 1 Adjustable Rate Rid*r 
[~] Graduaicd Paymcnx Rider 
[ 7 1 Balloon Ri^ lCT 
I 1 Miiiepicbcnnitiort Rider 
1 j Cojidouuiiiuw Rid£r 
I | Planned Unit Development Rider 
[ y ] Raw improvement Rider 
[ g ] Construction Rider 
£ ] 1-4 ft nuly Rjd«J 
L ] Biwcc J> foyrocm Rider 
|T ] Sccojii' Hunw Rider 
BY SIGNING BELOW, Ponawcr adepts and agrws to die- term* mid covenants co mined i . una Security Instrontfiu 
und in any ridtr(s) execmed by Borrower aud recorded v»idi it. 
/^ZZ^/ 
AXJur SQT7: 




. ^ ^ . 
)ss. 
IE 
before ^{^fiUiLc _v pea anally 1jpeitred 
personalty known 10 i fatx proved TO me un tne basis of Snriintctory evidence) to be the per jn(i) V»1 M * OHDIC(*) is/are 
subscribed TO in? within instrument and ackno^lcdjjed, to nic dmi hc/SbtJih&y executed, tjie sa n* in In: /tocr/thior authorized 
capacit ies) , and lh*r by his/her/tbeir *ign4*ur*W un tbfi insttujoecm. die person^, ox tbccjKrOipon behalf of which the 
person(s) acied, executed the msirumrm s ^ \ -—^ *•* • s* *f-— 
CUNT B WILSON 
_ _ J f t NOTARY PUBUC 'STAJEofUJAH 
v -B^S yll 116Z N0Ff™ 1"»»° EAST 
X ^ S y AMERJGAN FORK, UTAH 64008 
^ -'- • '"•" COMM, EXP. 4-0-2003 
tSeStf 
My commission expires: 
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CONSTRUCTION RIDER 
THIS CONSTRUCTION Rider K made this 
19TB DAY OF JANUARY, 2001 , and is incorporated in 0 and rudi be 
deemed to amend and supplement die Mortgage, Peed of Trust or S :curity Deed t.ihe 
"Security Instrument*) of the same date given by die undersigned (h Borrow er*> to secure 
Borrowers Adjustable Rate Mote or Fixed Rate Note (die "Note") i > 
INDYMAC SANK, F - S - B - , 
3. f e d e r a l l y c h a r t e r e d s a v i n g s bar It 
(die "Lender") of the same date and covering the property describe*: in ins Securiiy 
Instrument and located at; 
2350 WE3T RED PINE COURT 
PARK CITY, UT 84058 
(Property Address) 
ADDITIONAL COVENANTS, In addition to die covenant made n die 
Security Instrument, Borrower and Lender further covenant and agr * as ft Hows: 
1. CONSTRUCTION LOAN AGREEMENT. Borrower hall pt )rapdy pay 
and pertbrm wrien due all of Borrower's obligations under disLCcem m Con iCrucrion Loan 
Agreement, dated the same date as the Security Instrumeni: (die "Cc istruct pn Loan 
Agreement") and all amendments dicrcio. The loan evidenced by i| c Note will be 
DDS-Wl FCRMIMMCMl 
RECORDER'S NOTE 
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advanced to Borrower pursuant to the Construction Loan Agreemen , The period of ume 
commencing on the daie hereof and ending on ihe last day of die m» nth hi x/hich die 
"Completion Dare" under the Construction Loan Agreement occurs s refer ed to herein 
as the "Construction Period." If there is no "Adjustable Rate Rig>r attach jd hereto ihe 
first day of the first month sfter the Completion Date occurs is refej 'ed to I lerem as the 
"Permanent Loan Commencement Data, If there is an Adjustable taw Rjder attached 
hereto, the "Permanent Loan Commencement Date" shall be me dai ? referied to in such 
Adjustable Rate Rider. The period of time commencing on the Pen lauent Loan 
Commencement Pate and ending on the Maturity Date described be ow is i efrrred to 
herein as the "Permanent Loan Period." The expiration of the Con? tructio i Period may 
be evidenced by the Lender's execution and recordation in the Of fie A1 RCC xds of the 
County where the Property is located of a supplement to die Securit r Insm mem v^ hich 
includes a certification stating ihe Completion Date, the Permanent _oan 
Commencement Date, the Maturity Date and the principal balance i f the U an evidenced 
by die Note on the Permanent Loan Commencement Date. Any sul sequer: holder of ihe 
Security Instrument shall be enrided to rely on such certification. 
2. MATURITY DATE. The Indebtedness evidenced by di» Note, if not earlier 
paid, shall become due and payable on 3 0 years after the Perm uieni 1 Dan 
Commencement Date. That date is called the "Maturity Date." 
3. INTEREST RATE DURING CONSTRUCTION PER OD. 1 )uring the 
Construction Period, die Note provides for an interest rate of 9«5 0 ) ' &. Tnis rate 
may change during the Permanent Loan Period as provided in the I* ote or n any other 
Rider aitached to the Security Instrument, 
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4- URIDGE LOAN NOTE* Borrower apees thai if, as de cribed in the 
Construction Loan Agreement, Borrower has obtained an additional "bridge" loan torn 
Lender, then the Security Instrument secures, in addition to all oblij ations :et forth! 
therein, ail obligations of Borrower under the note evidencing such >ridge oan, which 
note is dated ff/A and is in t le ong rial principal 
amount of ? N/A [state date and amount or" iot app icable") (the 
"Bridge Loan Note") and all other documents relating theretov ami t iat all •eferences in 
the Security Instrument to die "Note" or the indebtedness or debt se :ured b / the Security 
Instrument shall include the Bridge Loan Note as well as all other n lies ret irrnsd to in the 
Security Instrument, 
5. SECURITY AGREEMENTS? FIXTURE FILING. Ti e term "Property" as 
used in ihis Security Instrument shall also include al) building maiei als, apDlianeeii, 
equipment, machinery, goads and fixtures (collectively, "personal r. -open}") now or 
hereafter located on or attached or affixed to the real property descr bed he 'ein, the cost 
of which was paid, in whole or in part, itom the proceeds of the loi n madt by Leiader to 
Borrower pursuant to the Construction Loan Agreement and BOITO- /er her :by grants to 
Lender a security interest in and to the personal property and all on seeds I ereof, 
pursuant to the Security Instrument and the Uniform Commercial C ide of he state 
where the real property is locatedt and all rights and remedies of a ? scured parry vindcr 
the Uniform Commercial Code in die event of any breach of any cc /enanc x agreement 
in the Security Instrument. Borrower shall execute and deliver sue! fiaan£ ng staiements 
as Lender may request in order to perfect Lender's security interest m the j crsonal 
?Toperty. The Security Instrument constitutes a fixture filing with j rspect o any and all ixtures or any goods which may now be or may hereafter become | ixtures included 
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BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepis and agrees to ihe erms a id covenants 
cpwaincd in thisjG^j^ajcjion Rider. 
r-ct-o ( 




LEGIBILITY OF WRITING. TYPING OR 
PRINTING UNSATISFACTORY IN THIS 
DOCUMENT WHEN RECEIVED. 0 0 5 8 1 0 4 6 BK01350 P401069 
TabB 
Roy S t r i n g f e l l o w A p r i l 7, 2006 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
SUMMIT COUNTY, 




THE CIT GROUP/CONSUMER 
FINANCE, INC., a Delaware 
corporation; and WESTLAND 
TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
DISTRICT COURT J 
STATE OF UTAH 1 
dba LINCOLN TITLE INSURANCE 
AGENCY, and FIRST 
SOUTHWESTERN TITLE AGENCY 
OF UTAH, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
April 7, 2006 * 
Location: Castle, Mei 
102 West 500 Sout 
Salt Lake City, 
Reporter: Lisa 
Notary Public m and 
D'E 
for 
) Rule 30(b)(6) 
) Telephonic Deposition of: 
) CIT GROUP/CONSUMER 
) FINANCE, INC. 
) By: ROY STRINGFELLOW 
) No. 050500373 
) Judge Lubeck 
1:00 p.m. j 
nhold & Stawiarski 
h, Suite 300 
Utah 84111 
lia, CSR, RPR 
the State of Utah 
C i t i C o u r t , LLC 
8 0 1 . 5 3 2 . 3 4 4 1 
bfee6c14-48d4-4adc-a217-




























Page 5 | 
I'm employed with The CIT Group. j 
And what is your current position with 












I could not hear. I'm sorry. 
I'm the vice president of loss mitigation. 
And what is loss mitigation? Is that a 
within CIT? 
Yes, it is. 
How many departments are there within CIT? 
I could not answer that. I don't know. A 








And I don't know the answer to that either 
a lot. 
How many offices does the loss mitigation 
have? 
Well, for just -- I'm in the home lending 
f loss mitigation and so I can't answer 
that because CIT is a $60 billion corporation with 
6500 emplo; 
Q. 
Okay. So " 
yees multi-national. 
Those were some of my next questions. 
bhat's good. 
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Page 29 
the Notice of Default had been cancelled, but can you 
tell me, do you know when CIT first became aware that 
the Notice of Default at issue here had been 
cancelled? 
A. That would be the November 9th day, 
because that's just from the notes going back and 
reading the notes. 
Q. So November 9th of '04 was the earliest 
date — 
A. Yes. 
Q. — that CIT was aware of it? 
A. Correct. As far as I can tell from the 
notes. Again, just going back and reviewing the 
notes, which is a manual and tedious process. 
Q. Yes. 
(EXHIBIT-6 WAS MARKED.) 
Q. (By Mr. Coebergh) Roy, we just marked as 
Exhibit 6 to your deposition, once again, going to 
your e-mail attachment, at the bottom it is page 
numbers 19, 20, and 21. It's entitled Substitution 
of Trustee. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Do you have that in front of you? 
A. Yes, sir. 























A. Well, it was several months later. It 
looks like here that we finally got a payoff because 
they continued not to listen to us. They wouldn't 
give us a payoff. It looks like, just according to 
my notes here, we did not get an actual payoff from 
them until August of f05. 
Q. When you say "they would not listen to 
us," who is "they"? 
A. The counsel for RJ Media, I assume. You 
would have to check with ForeclosureLink on who they 
were trying to get the payoff through. 
Q. Other than going through ForeclosureLink, 
did you or anybody in your department, Dale or 
anybody else, did you do anything yourself to follow 
up directly with RJW Media or their counsel? 
A. Not that I'm aware of, no. That's why we 
have ForeclosureLink. 
Q. For instance, did you or Dale or anybody 
else in your department have any telephone 
conversations with anybody from RJW Media, Inc.? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. Any written communication going back and 
forth in response to this November 18, 2004 letter as 



























intended to go ahead with this foreclosure sale, 
correct? 
A. It's -- yes, that's what they were telling 
me. 
Q. Now, did you personally at that point in 
time think it was necessary to do anything to try to 
prevent this foreclosure sale from happening? 
A. No. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Because the Notice of Default was an 
invalid Notice of Default. It had been cancelled. 
Q. So knowing that RJW Media intended to go 
ahead with the foreclosure sale, was it your 
intention to do anything at that point in an effort 
to preserve CIT's rights? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So what is it that you did in an effort to 
preserve CIT's rights? 
A. We went and we requested an updated title. 
We went to ForeclosureLink then and told them to get 
a payoff from them and just watch what's going on. 
Let's keep an eye on it. Whenever they file a new 
Notice of Default, let's make sure that we answer in. 
Q. Did you or anybody within CIT intend to 































any Note Purchase and Sale Agreement or any potential 
agreement with RJW Media, Inc. at that time? 1 
A. I'm sure we did, yes. I'm sure he told me 
there was a $20,000 offer and I'm sure I told him 
that we would not take that. Obviously, I did. We 
declined it and never completed it. 
Q. Do you know if anybody from CIT actually 
contacted the RJW Media attorney to decline this r 
offer? 
A. Of course -- I can't answer that, but, of 
course, there's no need to actually call because if 
we don't fill it out, obviously we rejected it. 
Q. Roy, I may be wrong, but isn't it correct 
that representatives of CIT had actually been in 
contact with RJW Media attorneys starting as early as 
June of 2004? 
A. I don't know that. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I can't answer that. Not that I'm aware 
of. 
Q. To your knowledge, Roy, your personal 
knowledge, the only contact with RJW Media, Inc. 
attorneys and CIT that you know of is this November 









 A. No. Because, unfortunately, in our 
2
 system, a lot of times our people will just say spoke 
3
 to John, you know. They may not say, you know, with 
4
 someone's office, they just say spoke with John and, 
5
 you know, I don't know who they're from. 
6
 Q. When somebody makes an electronic note in 
7
 your system, does that electronic note automatically 
8
 have some sort of identification as to who entered 
9
 the note? 
A. Yes. It will give you an identification, 
11
 who entered in the date and time. 
12
 Q. Is that by initial? 
13
 A. No. It's by name. 
14
 Q. By name. Okay. 
15
 From your testimony, Roy, it appears that 
16
 CIT was on notice as early as December 15 of 2004, 
17
 that the foreclosure sale scheduled for December 13 
of 2004 had actually gone forward? 
A. That it was going forward, yes. 
Q. But that is --
A. As to what date? I'm sorry. Let me back 
up. What date did you say? 
Q. My question was, from your testimony, it 
appears that CIT was on notice as early as December 
25
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Page 55 
December 13 of 2004 had actually gone forward? 
A. That may very well be true, yes. You 
know, again, the whole sale on the 13th was just a 
moot point to me because, again, we had no valid 
Notice of Default. 
Q. Did Alan Squires make any payments to CIT 
on his $300,000 promissory note? 
A. Hold on just a second. Let me look here 
and see. 
He did, yes. 
Q. And how many -- well, let me ask you 
differently. At any point in time did Mr. Squires or 
his LLC, Spyglass, ever stop making payments on that 
promissory note? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. At what point in time did the debtor stop 
making payments on the promissory note? 
A. The last payment we received was April 28 
of 2003. 
Q. And do you have an overview in your system 
of all these payments that were made and amounts and 
dates and everything? 
A. Yes, sir. 
(EXHIBIT-12 WAS MARKED.) 
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Client: INDYMAC BANK 
After recording, mail to: 
First Southwestern Tide Agency of Utah, Inc. 
102 West 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(801) 961-9550 
NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN by First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc., 
SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE, that a default has occurred under that certain Trust Deed dated 
January 19, 2001, executed by ALAN SQUIRES, the TRUSTOR, in favor of INDYMAC 
RANK, F.S.B., as BENEFICIARY, in which SIGNATURE TITLE was named TRUSTEE, 
but Krst Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc. having been substituted as Trustee by a 
written Substitution of Trustee dated September 29, 20Q3, the Trust Deed having been 
recorded in the office of the County Recorder of SUMMIT County, State of Utah, on 
January 24, 2001 as Entry No. 00581046, in Book 01350, at Page 01059 , of Official 
Records, all relating to and describing the real property situated in the County of SUMMIT, 
State of Utah, particularly described as follows: 
LOT 3, DUTCH DRAW AT CANYON ESTATES SUBDIVISION, PARK 
CITY, UTAH, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON 
FILE IN THE OFFICE OF THE SUMMIT COUNTY RECORDER. 
Tax Serial No. DDCE-3 
Property Address! 2350 West Red Pine Court, Park City, UT 84098 
Said Trust Deed secures certain obligations under a Note secured by a Deed of Trust, 
of even date, in the original principal amount of $1,900,000-00, bearing interest at the rate 
of 7.62500% per annum and the beneficial interest under the Deed of Trust and the 
obligations secured thereby are now owned by DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 
COMPANY AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT 
SERIES 2002-A. 
That the default which has occurred is the breach of an obligation for which the trust 
property was conveyed as security and consists of the failure of the Trustor to pay monthly 
principal and interest payments since May 1, 2003 and each month thereafter. That there is 
now due and owing on said note the sum of $1,882,908.97 together with interest at the rate 
of 7.62500% per annum from April 1, 2003. There is also due all of the expenses and fees 
of these foreclosure proceedings. 
That by reason of such default, DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 
COMPANY AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT 
SERIES 2O02-A, the Beneficiary under said Trust Deed, has executed and delivered to said 
0 0 6 7 5 6 S 2 BKQ15?4 PG01559-0J560 
ALAN SFRXGGS* SUBMIT CD RECORDER 
2 0 0 3 OCT OS 1 $ : U PH FEE * t 3 U 0 0 BY DttG 
REQUEST: FIRST SOUTHWESTERN TITLE MEKCY 
BK1574 PC1559 
NOV 10 2 0 0 4 3 : 3 b PN PR PHKK U l l Y I I I L b 4 3 b b 4 b 3 13 1 IU UIKUNH tJUbMfNtLL 
Successor Trustee a written declaration of default and demand for sale, and has deposited 
with said Successor Trustee such Trust Deed and all documents evidencing the obligations 
secured thereby and has declared and does hereby declare all sums secured thereby 
immediately due and payable and has elected and does hereby elect to cause the trust 
propeny to be sold to satisfy the obligations secured thereby. The defaulr is subject to 
reinstatement in accordance with the Statutes of the State of Utah, 
DATED October 2, 2003, 
DUE TO THB COLOR OF THE INK 
OF THE N O T A R Y ^ AFFIX© 
TDTH1SIX)CUMB^T,THE 
SEAL MAY ^UNSATISFACTORY 
FOR COPYING, 
First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc. 
•Vw^u m I\J^ By: 
Don H7 Meinhold, Vice President or 
Loretta K. Poch, A$st Vice President or 
Shauna M. Burice, Asst. Vice President or 
Terri Shackelford, Assi, Vice President 
Successor Trustee 
102 West 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
On October 2, 2003, personally appeared before me, 
t of First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc . , Successor Trustee, who being 
6&Ai 
first duly sworn did acknowledge before me that she is the Assistant Vice President of the 
Successor Trustee and the signer of the foregoing Notice of Default. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
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NOTE PURCHA5E AND SALE AGREEMENT 
This NOTE PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT (this "Agreement") is 
made this'2l" day of July 2004, by and between RJW Media, Inc. ("Purchaser") 
and Deutsche Bank National Trus! Company as Truslee Under the Pooling and 
Servicing Agreement Sarins 2002A ("Seller"). 
RECITALS 
A. Seller Is the owner and holder of a Fixed Rate Promissory Note, dated 
January 19, 2DD1, in the original principal amount of One Million Nine Hundred 
Thousand Dollars and zero cents ($1,900,000,00) (the "Note11), made by Alan 
Squires, a married man as hie sola and separate property ("Borrower"), 
B. The Note has been modified by a Loan Modification Agreement made-
March 20, 2002 (the "Modification"). The Note and Modification are referred to 
herein collectively, as the "Note," 
C.. The indebtedness evidenced by the Note was incurred in connection with 
InclyMac Construction Loan Number 885938, as converted to IndyMac Permanent 
Loan Number 1551746 made to Borrower (the "Loan"). 
D, The obligations of Borrower und^r the Note are sDcurod by a 
Construction and Permanent Deed of Trust and Fixture Filing, dated January 19, 
20D1, signed by Alan Squires, as trustor, in favor of IndyMac Bank, F.S.B,, a 
federally chartered savings bank, as beneficiary, recorded January 2.4, 2001, as 
Entry Number 581046, in Book 1350, beginning at page 1059 of the official 
records of Summit County, Utah (the "Trust Deed"). The Trusl Deed encumbers 
certain real property owned by Borrower and located In Summit County, Utah 
commonly described as 2350 NW Rod Pino Court, Part; City, UT 84-098 (the 
'Property"). 
E; The lerm Borrower Includes Spyglass Development, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company in which Alan Squires is a member, 
F. Borrower has defaulted in the payment of principal, interest and late 
charges under the Note In the approximate sum of $2,068,000.00. 
6. Seller desires to sell and assign to Purchaser the Loan, the Note, the Trust 
Deed and all other lions and security interests in favor of Seller thai secure 
payment of the Loan (severally and colleciivfily, the "Indebtedness"), Purchaser 
desires to purchase the indebtedness &r\d receive title to the Note and the Trust 
Q 
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Deed in .ho name of RJW M A fc al upon me fcrms and c-.dl.on, * * forth 
haroiru 
^ S e ^ n S ~ ^ - from s o - the I n d i c e s . 
, Purchaser ,s a aophirtcatod and experienced purchaser at mortgaoe 
te J ' a n d taao^to « £ l U f t n U and !egal ad«e. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree ac follows: 
j r-u. writer hereby sells, transfers;, assigns and conveys 
J p J S f f l ^ *K %%>> "-*ln and 10 ^  'TranEacton 
Instruments"): 
<„ ^ Loan ^ ^ J ^ ^ t ^ t . I n S L o T S 
, ^ AII foreclosure files and payment histories pertaining to Sorrower and 
r L s S ? S S also pmvide any other documents in its possess.on thai 
S S B I J to X X 'he e^enoe of and bnlance due on the Loan. 
,sr.i,4/sMtinn nf the Seller's sale and assignment to 
2. m ^ ^ J ^ ^ ^ ^ J ^ B and othor documents or 
Purchaser of the Indebted ^ » * ^
 P u r c t o r shall pay Seller One 
instruments contemplated b y J ^ ^ ^ J J ,





u f f p d , , p ^ e ^ Payment must be mad, on or 
« » « 2 3 ^ mPaU" b T w K ' - L r to (BaN* A - u n ^ 
Sen tSr IndyCc Repurchase Administraton/Ugal Settlement 
Rpteronce#l551748/Squiros 
., , • « nr-^nntni fHrm of thtfc Agreement and a condition to any The payment date is an essenta ienjoi i n * J
 p u r c h a c e r , P u r c h a s e r agrees 
t^z^^^in — w,th *•Loan'requlrod by 
D7/:>6;/?(')M FJ3: 53 97^JB3 tori97 UMIVC5CD PAGC Bcj/D3 
operation of law or accounting requirements, Seller agrees to (I) send to Buyer's 
counsel, via Federal Express (or another overnight service), within two (2) business 
days of rocelving the Purchase Price In Sailer's Account, the Transaction 
Instruments (except the foreclosure files which may take a few extra days to send), 
a fully-executod original ol this Agreement executed by Seller and the Assignment 
o1 Trust Deed fully executed and notarized by Seller; and (II) not disburse the 
Purchase Price from Seller's Account until Seller receives written confirmation that 
Buyer's counsel has received the Transaction Documents, y fully-Ex&cutod original 
of this Agreement and the fully-executed and notarized Assignment of Trust Deed, 
3. Consummation of Transaction, Upon satisfaction of all of the conditions 
Eel forth in Section 4 below, Seller shall forthwith deliver and transfer to Purchaser: 
(a) The original Note, endorsed by Seller to Purchaser (with an 
endorsement mutually acceptable to both parties); 
(b) The original Trust Deed: 
(c) An original Assignment of Deed of Trust resigning Seller's interest in 
the Trust Deed to Purchaser, in form suitable for recording; 
(d) The original Title Policy; and 
(e) All foreclosure files and payment histories pertaining to Borrower and 
the Loan. Seller shall also provide any other documents in Its possession thai 
are necessary to prove-up the existence of and balance due on the Loan, 
4. Seller^ Conditions Precedent, Sellers obligation to consummate this 
transaction and to deliver to Purchaser the documents described in Section 3 
above is expressly subject to the satisfaction at the following conditions precedent: 
(a) Seller shall have received this Agreement duly executed and 
delivered to Seller by Purchaser; and 
(b) Seller shall have received the full Purchase Price in immediately 
available funds, 
5i Soiled Covenant, From and after the closing of the transaction 
contemplated by this Agreement, Sailor shall not pursue any collection efforts undar 
the Loan against Borrower, Seller may pursue any rights In connection with the 
Loan thai ll may have against third parties, including, without limitation; the 
mortgage broker and appraiser. 
6. Rgprs&ftntofions of Poller. Seller represents and warrants to Purchaser 
as follows; 
1 A 
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(a) Seller is the owner and holdor of the Note, 
(b) Seller possesses all requisite power and authority to enter into this 
Agreement, to transfer and assign the Loan and the Loan Documents to 
Purchaser, and lo perform Its duties and obligations as described in this 
Agreement, 
(c) To the best of Sellers knowledge, Bonowsr has no valid defense or 
setoff to the payment of any portion of the Loan balance, 
(d) Seller has not assigned, pledged or sold the Note to any third party, 
in whole or in part. 
(a) To the best oi Seller's knowledge, the lien of the Trust Deed is a 
valid first position Hen and incumbrance on and against the Property. 
(f) The individual executing this Agreement on behalf of Seller has-
been duly authorized to sign this Agreement and to bind Seller to perform 
the obligations of Seller under this Agreement. 
(g)The execution of this Agreement and the consummation of the 
transaction contemplated by this Agreement will not violate any article, 
bylaw or other corporate restriction of Seller and, to the best of Seller's 
knowledge, will not violate any order, ruling, regulation or demand of any 
court, regulatory agency or other tribunal to which Seller Is subject 
(h)This Agreement, when duly executed by Seller, shall constitute a 
valid, legal and binding obligation oi Seller and shall be enforceable in 
accordance with Its terms, except to the extent that enforceability may be 
limited by applicable) bankruptcy, insolvency or other similar rights 
affecting the enforcement ot creditor's rights generally, 
7, Repre.sffntc^ons of Purchaser, Purchaser represents and warrants 
to Seller as follows; 
(a) Purchaser possesses all requisite power and authority to enter into 
this Agreement and to perform its duties and obligations as described in 
this Agreement, 
(b)The individual executing this Agreement on behalf of Purchaser has 
been duly authorized to sign this Agreement and to bind Purchaser to 
perform the obligations of Purchaser under this Agreement, 
(c)The execution of this Agreement and the consummation of the 
transaction contemplated by this Agreement will not violate Purchaser's 
organizational documents and, to the best of Purchaser's knowledge, will 
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not violate any order, ruling, regulation or demand of any court, regulatory 
agoncy or other tribunal to which Purchaser Is subject 
(d) This Agreement, when duly executed by Purchaser, shall constitute 
a valid, legal and binding obligation of Purchaser and shall be enforceable 
in accordance with Its terms, except to the extent thai enforceability may 
be limited by applicable bankruptcy, insolvency or othor similar rights 
affecting creditors' rights generally. 
8. Purchaser's Acknowledgment, Purchaser hereby acknowledges that 
Purchaser has-made iis own independent investigation of the financial condition 
and business affairs of the Borrower and all other persons or entities thai have 
executed any of the Loan Documents, and has reviewed and made Its own 
determination as to: (1) the enforceability of the Indebtedness and (2) the 
existence, condition, location or value of any property, real or personal, 
encumbered pursuant to or affected by or described in any of the Loan Documents, 
•including without limitation, any litigation in connection with the Property and the 
Borrower. Purchaser is aware thai Spyglass Development LLCr has filed for 
bankruptcy protection and that Borrower may take other action to prevent 
Purchaser from enforcing the Indebtedness. Seller does not make any 
representations or warranties of any kind, express or Implied, wlih respect to the 
Property, the Indebtedness or the Loan Documents, except as $&\ forth in this 
Agreement Seller and Purchaser hereby expressly acknowledge and agree that 
the Indebtedness shall be sold and assigned by Seller to Purchaser WITHOUT 
RECOURSE against Seller, and without representation or warranty of any Kind, 
express or implied, except as set forth in this Agreement. Purchaser waives any 
right to disclosure regarding the Property under State or Federal law. 
9. Release;. 
(a) Release by Purchaser. Purchaser hereby fully and forever waives, 
relinquishes, releases and discharges Seller from any and all claims, demands, 
controversies, actions, causes of action, debts, liabilities, rights, contracts, 
damages, costs (including attorney's fees and court and litigation costs and 
expenses), indemnities, obligations, Interest and losses of any kind or nature 
whatsoever, whether at this time known or unknown, anticipated or unanticipated, 
direct or indirect, fixed or contingent, which may expressly exist i>y reason of any 
act, omission, event, transaction, manner or cause whatsoever, arising out of or 
related to the Property, the Loan Documents or the Indebtedness, except as may 
arise from Seller's braach of the representations and warranties s#t forth) in this 
Agreement 
(b) Release Extends to Unknown Claims. Purchaser expressly 
represents and warrants ihaf the principals of Purchaser have read and fully 
understand the provisions of Section 1542 of the Civil Code of California, which 
states as follows: 
t o 
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A GENERAL RELEASE DOES WOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS 
WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO 
EXIST IN HIS FAVOR AT THE TIME OF EXECUTION OF THE 
RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HIM MUST HAVE 
MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS SETTLEMENT WITH THE 
DEBTOR, 
Having been apprised of the statutory language of such Section 1M2, 
Purchaser olocts to assume all rbk for claims heretofore and hereafter 'arising, 
known or unknown and expressly waives and relinquishes all rights and benefits 
which Purchaser may have under Section 1542 of the Civil Code of California 
relating to the Property, the Loan Documents or the Indebtedness, except uz may 
arise from Sailer's breach of the representations and warranties set forth in this 
Agreement, 
10. Absonce of Broker Involvement, Each party hereto represents and 
warrants to the other that it has not employed any broker or finder in connection 
with the transaction contemplated by this Agreement, Each party shall indemnify, 
defend and hc>id the other harmless from all liability and expense including, without 
limitation, attorneys' fees arising from any claim by any other broker, ©gent or finder 
for commissions, finders fae& or similar charges, because of any act of such party. 
Notwithstanding any provision herein to the contrary, the obligations of the parltes 
pursuant to this Section 10 shall survive the closing and nny termination hereof. In 
no event shall Seller be liable to pay any commission to any broker, agent or finder 
in connection with the sale contemplated hereby. 
11. INDEMNIFICATION Purchaser hereby agrees to indemnify and hold 
Seller harmless and defend Seller and its directors, officers, employees, attorneys 
and apsnts, and their sepanato and respective successors and assigns, from all 
claims, losses, actions, damages, liabilities and expenses (including attorneys' fees 
and costs) arising from, related to or in connection with the Profx^riy, the Loan 
Documents or the Indebtedness or, actions and omissions of Purchaser and/or its 
successors and assigns that occur or, with respect to omissions, fall to occur, on or 
after the date hereof under or in connection with the Indebtedness, including 
without limitation any failure by Purchaser and/or Ite successors and assigns to act 
in a commercially reasonable manner, 
12. MISCELLANEOUS 
12.1 Notices. All notioes to be delivered in connection with this 
Agreement shall be in writing and shall be delivered in person, or d&Hvorod by 
depositing such notice in the United Stales Mall, certified mall, with postage 
prepaid, return receipt requested, add/esscd $& follows: 
13 
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Purchaser 
PJW Media, Inc., c/o Joseph E, Wrona 
Wrona, Fitlow & Parrish, P.O. 
1816 Prospector Ave., Suite 100 
Park City, UT 64060 
Telephone No. 435.649,2525 
Telecopier No, 435.649,5959 
Any such notice GO deposed in the United States Mall shall be deemed for all 
purposes of fhD Agreement to have been given when received. Any party to Whom 
notices are to be sent pursuant to this Agreement may from time to time change its 
address for further communications- hereunder by giving notice in the manner 
prescribed horain to the other parti' hereto, 
12.2 Integrated Agreement This Agreement constitutes and embodies 
the full and complete understanding and agreement of Salter and Purchaser with 
respect to the subject matter hereof and supersodss all prior understandings or 
agreements whether oral or in writing with regard thereto* 
12.3 Governing L^w, This Agreement shall be governed by and 
construed in accordance with the laws of the State of California. 
12.4 iieadings,. This Section headings ueod horcin are for convenience 
and reference only, and are not intended to define, limit or describe the scope or 
intent of any provision of this Agreement 
12.5 Successors and Assigns, This Agreement shall be binding upon and 
shall inure to the benefit oi the parties hereto and their separate and respective 
successors and assigns. 
12.6 Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in one or more 
counterparts;, each of which shall be deemed an original and all of which together 
shall constitute one and the same document Signature pages may bo detached 
from the counterparts and attached to a single copy of this document lo physically 
form one document. 
127 Wgjyor of Jury Trial, SELLER AND PURCHASER KNOWINGLY, 
VOLUNTARILY AND INTENTIONALLY WAIVE THE RIGHT EITHER MAY HAVE 
TO A TRIAL BY JURY WITH RESPECT TO ANY LITIGATION BASED HEREON, 
OR ARISING OUT OF, UNDER OR IN CONNECTION HEREWITH OR RELATED 
HERETO, OR ANY COURSE OF CONDUCT OR DEALING, STATEMENTS 
(WHETHER ORAL OR WRITTEN) OR ACTIONS OF EITHER PARTY. THIS 
Sqllffi 
lndyMac Bank F,S,B,, 
3455 East Foothill Blvd, 
Pasactona, CA 91107 
Attention: Michael Delbick 
Telephone No, 626,535.4823 
Telecopier No. 626.229-3254 
14 
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PROVISION IS A MATERIAL INDUCEMENT FOR THE PARTES TO ENTER 
INTO THIS AGREEMENT. 
12.8 Survival, The representations and warranties sel forth in this 
Agreement shall survive the execution, dellvory and/or recordation of any document 
delivered In connection with the transaction contemplated by this Agreement 
IM WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement as 
of the day and year first set forth above. 
SELLER: DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 
COMPANY AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE 
POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT 
SERIES 2002A, BY INDYMAC BANK, F.S.B., 
AS ATTORNEY IN FACT 
"-ByT <fr-
Its: &vi-4 





Fidelity National Title Insurance Company 
COMMITMENT FOR TITLE INSURANCE 
SCHEDULE A 
File No 16042 
Premium 
1 Effective Date September 09, 2004, 7:55 am 
2 Policy (or Policies) to be issued Amount 
(a) ALTA OWNER'S POLICY 
Proposed Insured 
(b) ALTA LOAN POLICY 
Pi oposed Insured 
3 Fee Simple interest in the land described in this Commitment is owned, at the Commitment Date, by 
THE ESTATE OF SPYGLASS DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., Bankrupt 
4 The land referred to in this Commitment is described in Schedule C 
Lot 3, Dutch Draw at Canyon Estates Subdivision, Park City, Utah, according to the official plat 
thereof on file in the office of the Summit County Recorder, records of Summit County, Utah. DDCE-
3 
PARK CITY TITLE COMPANY 
By 
Authorized Signatory 
ALIA Commitment - Schedule A Page 1 
File No: 16042 
Fidelity National Title Insurance Company 
COMMITMENT FOR TITLE INSURANCE 
SCHEDULE B - SECTION I 
REQUIREMENTS 
Effective Date: September 09, 2004, 7:55am 
The following requirements must be met: 
(a) Pay the agreed amounts for the interest in the land and/or according to the mortgage to be insured. 
(b) Pay us the premium, fees and charges for the policy. 
(c) Documents satisfactory to us creating the interest in the land and/or the mortgage to be insured must be signed, 
delivered and recorded: 
(d) You must tell us in writing the name of anyone not referred to in this Commitment who will get an interest in the 
land or who will make a loan on the land. We may then make additional requirements or exceptions. 
1. Pay and have reconveyed a Trust Deed dated January 19, 2001, executed by ALAN SQUIRES, 
as Trustor, and SIGNATURE TITLE, as Trustee, to INDYMAC BANK, F.S.B., a federally 
chartered savings bank, as Beneficiary, to secure the payment of $1,900,000.00 and interest, 
and recorded January 24, 2001 as Entry No. 581046, in Book 1350 at Page 1059, records of 
Summit County, Utah. 
Substitution of Trustee dated September 29, 2003, and recorded October 8, 2003, as Entry 
No. 675681 in Book 1574 at Page 1557, records of Summit County, Utah, wherein FIRST 
SOUTHWESTERN TITLE AGENCY OF UTAH is designated a Successor Trustee under 
said Trust Deed. 
Notice of Default executed under the terms of said Trust Deed was recorded October 8, 
2003, as Entry No. 675682 in Book 1574 at Page 1559, records of Summit County, Utah. 
Said Trust Deed has been assigned by mesne assignments and is now held of record by 
RJW MEDIA, INC., by virtue of Assignment recorded August 9, 2004, as Entry No. 706979 
in Book 1639 at Page 34, records of Summit County, Utah. 
2. Pay and have reconveyed a Trust Deed dated August 26, 2002, executed by ALAN SQUIRES, 
as Trustor, and AMERICAN TITLE, as Trustee, to THE CIT GROUP/CONSUMER 
FINANCE, INC., a Delaware corporation, as Beneficiary, to secure the payment of $300,000.00 
and interest, and recorded August 30, 2002 as Entry No. 630616, in Book 1469 at Page 982, 
records of Summit County, Utah. 
3. An action pending in the District Court of the Third, Judicial District in and for the County of 
Summit, State of Utah, entitled ROBERT J. WERRA, an individual vs. SKYGLASS 
DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company; and ALAN D. SQUIRES, an 
individual, and filed as Civil No. 040500178, records of Summit County, Utah. 
ALT/1 Commitment - Schedule B - Section I This commitment is invalid unless the insuring 
Provisions and Schedule A and B are attached. 
Lis Pendens in said action was recorded in the Office of the County Recorder on March 8, 
2004, as Entry No. 691022, in Book 1603 at Page 1200, records of Summit County, Utah. 
4. PROPERTY ADDRESS: 2350 West Red Pine Court, Park City, UT 84098. 
ALTA Commitment - Schedule B - Section I This commitment is invalid unless the insuring 
Provisions and Schedule A and B are attached. Page 3 
File No: 16042 
Fidelity National Title Insurance Company 
COMMITMENT FOR TITLE INSURANCE 
SCHEDULE B - SECTION II 
EXCEPTIONS 
Effective Date: September 09, 2004, 7:55am 
Any policy we issue will have the following exceptions unless they are taken care of to our satisfaction. 
1. Any facts, rights, interests or claims which are not shown by the public records but which could be ascertained by 
an inspection of said land or by making inquiry of persons in possession thereof. 
2. Any lien or right to a lien, for services, labor or material theretofore or hereafter furnished, imposed by law and 
not shown by the public records. 
3. Encroachments, overlaps, boundary line disputes and any matters which would be disclosed by an accurate 
survey and inspection of the premises. 
4. Rights of parties in actual possession of all or any part of the premises. 
5. Easements or claims of easements, not shown by the public records. 
6. Taxes for the year 2004 are proposed in the amount of $21,748.36, Serial No. DDCE-3. 
Taxes for the year 2003 have been paid in the amount of $20,264.00, under Serial No. DDCE-3. 
7. This property is within the Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District, Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District, Summit Count}' Special District #1, and is subject to the charges and assessments 
thereof. 
8. The effect of the Snyderville Basin Special Recreation District, recorded October 14,1986 as Entry No. 
259244 in Book 402 at Page 614, and modified by Resolution 93-2 recorded February 1,1993 as Entry No. 
373176 in Book 707 at Page 148, records of Summit County, Utah. 
9. Excepting all oil, gas, and other minerals of every kind and description underlying the surface of the 
subject property. 
10. Petition to Weber Basin Water Conservancy District for the Allotment of Water from Bella Canyon 
Development LC (Andrew K. Toolson & Scott Smith), recorded May 22, 2000 as Entry No. 565764 in Book 
1319 at page 977, records of Summit County, Utah. 
11. Agreement for Release of Existing Easements and Grant of Nonexclusive Right of Way by and between 
Bella Canyon Development, L.L.C., a Limited Company and Canyons Estates Homeowners Association, 
Inc., a Nonprofit Corporation, recorded June 23, 2000 as Entry No. 567958 in Book 1323 at page 686, 
records of Summit County, Utah. 
12. Assignment Agreement by and between Bella Canyon Development, LLC, a Utah Limited Liability 
Company and Old Standard Life Insurance Company, an Idaho corporation, recorded August 23, 2000 as 
Entry No. 571577 in Book 1331 at page 87, records of Summit County, Utah. 
13. Development Improvements Agreement for Project by and between Summit County and Bella Canyon 
Development L.L.C., recorded November 3, 2000 as Entry No. 576173 in Book 1340 at page 897, records of 
Summit County, Utah. 
ALTA Commitment - Schedule B - Section II This commitment is invalid unless the insuring 
PiOvisions and Schedule A and B are attached. 
14. The Canyons Resort Village Management Agreement, recorded December 15,1999 as Entry No. 555285 in 
Book 1300 at page 1, records of Summit County, Utah. 
First Amendment to the Canyons Resort Village Management Agreement, recorded December 17,1999 as 
Entry No. 555434 in Book 1300 at page 668, records of Summit County, Utah. 
Second Amendment to the Canyons Resort Village Management Agreement, recorded January 11, 2000 as 
Entry No. 556961 in Book 1303 at page 296, records of Summit County, Utah. 
15. Easements, Restrictions and Notes as shown on the recorded plat. 
16. Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Dutch Draw at Canyons Estates, recorded 
January 9, 2003 as Entry No. 644067 in Book 1503 at page 45, records of Summit County, Utah. 
17. Memorandum of Annexation Agreement by and between Bella Canyon Development, L.L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company, Allan Squires, Andy Toolson, and Timberwolf Subdivision Homeowners' 
Association, Inc., a Utah nonprofit corporation to amend the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and 
Restriction for Timberwolf Subdivision to subject Dutch Draw Subdivision to the benefits and burdens of 
the Declaration, recorded September 12, 2003 as Entry No. 672921 in Book 1568 at page 1676, records of 
Summit County, Utah. 
ALTA Commitment - Schedule B - Section II This commitmenl is invalid unless the insuring 
Piovisions and Schedule A and B aie attached. Page 5 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Page 1 




THE CIT GROUP/CONSUMER FINANCE, 
INC., a Delaware corporation; 
and WESTLAND TITLE INSURANCE 
AGENCY, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion, DBA LINCOLN TITLE 
INSURANCE AGENCY, and FIRST 
SOUTHWESTERN TITLE AGENCY OF 




Civil No. 050500373 
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
April 20, 2006 * 10:08 a.m. 
Location: Law Offices of Wrona & Parrish 
1816 Prospector Avenue, Suite 100 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Reporter: Sharon A. Hamilton, RPR, CSR, CMR 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah 
Certified Shorthand Reporter, State of California 
C i t i C o u r t , LLC 




























Blake Parrish * April 20, 2006 
Page 63 
Q. Did you request this document from Park 
City Title? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why did you request this document? 
MR. COEBERGH: Objection. That calls for 
attorney/client privileged information. 
Q. (By Mr. Middlemas) You were the Trustee. 
A. I wasn't at the time, no. 
Q. You were not the Trustee at the time? 
A. No. 
Q. Oh, that is true. Why did you then 
request this document otherwise? 
MR. COEBERGH: Same objection. 
Instruct you not to answer. 
Q. (By Mr. Middlemas) Why were you 
interested in the title history? 
A. Because I wanted to confirm that the 
assignment of the Deed of Trust had been properly 
recorded and appeared on the record. 
Q. Did this document, to your knowledge, 
reflect the title history of all recorded documents 
on the property to that time? 
A. I had no reason to believe it didn't. 
Q. Did you ever obtain an update to this 
title commitment — 
CitiCourt, LLC 
801.532.3441 
70fdca07-27e5-447d-b4a1 -1151 a4266e8a 






























(By Mr. Middlemas) Okay. "To your 
did First Southwestern Title mail a copy 






What about to RJW Media, Inc.? 
No. 
Okay. Other than the communication you 
had with Amy, as of September 22nd, 2004, the date 
when this 
with First 
document was recorded, had you communicated 















There was a -- no. 
Okay. And you stated that you first found 
the Cancellation of Notice of Default some 
er the sale, is that correct? 
Correct. 
How many months would you say? 
When we received notice I believe it was 
Almost five months. 
What was your reaction? 
Surprise. 
What did you do about it? 






























Blake Parrish * April 20, 2006 
Page 74 
date. If not today. 
Q. Well, let me continue with what I've got 
right now. You became aware of the cancelled Notice 
of Default. 
A. (Witness nods head up and down.) 
Q. To your knowledge, when you held the sale 
was the Notice of Default -- had the Notice of 
Default been cancelled at that time? 
A. To my knowledge, no. 
Q. Notice of Default — looking at the 
documents now, to your knowledge did -- a Notice of 
Default had not been cancelled at the time of the 
sale? 
A. You're asking -- that's a different 
question than I just answered. 
Q. Was the Notice of Default cancelled prior 
to your sale? 
A. Was the Notice of Default cancelled prior 
-- I think you're asking for a legal conclusion on 
that. 
Q. Was the Cancellation of Notice of Default 
recorded prior to your sale? 
A. Yes, it's apparent now there was a j 
cancellation recorded. The question is whether it . 
was a validly authorized and recorded notice of 
CitiCourt, LLC 
801.532.3441 
70fdca07-27e5-447d-b4a1 -1151 a4266e8a 
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Exhibit 4 before today? 
Yes. 
And what is this document? 
Assignment of Trust Deed from Deutsche 
Bank to RJW, and attorneys -- you know, obviously 
there was 
Q. 
an agreement between Deutsche and IndyMac. 
And on the top of this document it states, 



















"102 West 500 South, Suite 300." 
Yes. 
Which was the main office address — 
Right. 
— that you gave to me earlier? 
As you sit here today, do you know if this 
was actually sent to First Southwestern at 
July 30th of 2004? 
I don't know. It didn't come to me. 
And do you know if it came to anybody at 
thwestern? 
I don't. 
And so you cannot tell me when anybody at i 













































Lt question, just to clarify, r 
the person giving that specific 
is contained in the Trustee's Sale 1 
Le? 
Yes. 
And how was the instruction communicated 























of a letter? 
of a -- yes. 
you recall what that letter says 
record Cancellation of Notice of 
say anything else? 
you know who within First 
received that letter from Shapiro 
It would have came through our recording 
desk, and with the Cancellation of Notice of Default, 
































anybody within First Southwestern was aware of that 
at the time the Cancellation of Notice of Default 
contained in Exhibit 5 was recorded that IndyMac was 
no longer a beneficiary on the note secured by the 
Trust Deed at issue? 
A. No. 
Q. Or that even Deutsche Bank was no longer a 
beneficiary on that note? 
A. No. 
Q. And that, indeed, the record beneficiary 
was RJW Media, Inc.? 1 
A. I had no knowledge. 
Q. And that at least based on the records, 
First Southwestern's duty as trustee would run to 
RJW Media, Inc., not to IndyMac? 
A. (Pause) How do I answer that? I guess it 
would with the recorded documents, yes. 
(Private off-the-record discussion between 
the witness and Mr. Middlemas.) 
MR. COEBERGH: Mark this as Exhibit 6, 
which is pages 19 through 21. 
(EXHIBIT-6 WAS MARKED.) 
Q. (By Mr. Coebergh) Ms. Blanco, have you 























STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
) ss 
) 
I, Lisa D'Elia, Registered Professional 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of 
Utah, do hereby certify: 
That prior to being examined, the witness, 
NANCY L. BLANCO, was by me duly sworn to tell the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; 
That said deposition was taken down by me 
in stenotype on April 7, 2006, at the place therein 
named, and was thereafter transcribed and that a true 
and correct transcription of said testimony is set 
forth in the preceding pages; 
I further certify that, in accordance with 
Rule 30(e), a request having been made to review the 
transcript, a reading copy was sent to Mr. Middlemas 
for the witness to read and sign before a notary 
public and then return to me for filing with Mr. 
Coebergh. 
I further certify that I am not kin or 
otherwise associated with any of the parties to said 
cause of action and that I am not interested in the 
outcome thereof. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFICIAL SEAL this 
10th day of April, 2006. 






Client: INDYMAC BANK 
First'Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc. 
KJ2 Wesi 500 Soutb, Suite 300 
Salt Lake Chy,UT 84)0] 
C.A-Mf!R1J.AT]ON OF NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
COMES NOW, First Southwestern Title Agency of Drab, Inc., Successor Trustee, tuid 
hereby cancels the Notice of Default, which was recorded on October 8,2003, as Entry No. 
675681, io Book 1574, at Page 1559 of Official P.ecords of SUMMIT County, Stale of Urnb 
covering the real property located in SUMMIT County, State of Utah which is described as 
follows: 
LOT 3, DUTCH DRAW AT CANYON ESTATES SUBDIVISION,PARK CITY, 
UTAH, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL FLAT THEREOF ON FILE IN THE 
OFFICE OF THE SUMMIT COUNTY RECORDER. 
Tax SeriaJ No. DDCE-3 
DATED September 20,2004 
O 0 7 1 1 5 5 4 - BK.0U47 PGO1535-01825 
ALAN SPRIG'SS, SUMMIT CD RECORDER: / 
2004 SEP 22 16;50 Pfl HE 51D,W/By CJW 
REQUEST: FIRST BDUTHMESTERH TITUjJ-
'Fhsi Soutlnrcstcru Titlt Agency of TJtJuh, Inc. 
BY: m ^ J ^ w i 
LORETTA K, POCH, Asst. V~icc President or 
SHAUNA M, BURKE, Asst. Vice President or 
NANCY BLANCO, Assi. Vice President 
Successor Trustee 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
OD September 20, 2004, personally appeared before me, .^_r\h[}» f\ 0? i^J/l.^Lof 
Fitsi Southwestern Tiile Agency of Ufcah, Inc., Successor Trustee* who b i^nf; first duly sworn 
did acknowledge before me Lhnf she it illR SiicriRssoT Trustee and the signer of the foregoing 
CancollftlioD of Notice of Default, 





NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE 
The following, described property, situated m Summit Couniy, State of Uiali, will be sold at 
public auction to the highest bidder, payable in lawful money of the United States, at the mam 
entrance of the Summit County Courthouse located ai 50 North Main, Coalville, Utah, on 
Monday, December 13, 2004 at 11:00 a.m., for the purpose of foreclosing that certain Deed of 
Trust ("Deed of Trust") recorded January 24, 2001, in the official records of Summit County, 
State of Utah, as Eniry No. 00581046, m Book 03150, beginning ai page 01059, executed by 
ALAJ\] SQUIRES, as Trustor, in which SIGNATURE TITLE was named as the original Trustee, 
and INDYMAC BANK, F.S.B. was named as the original Beneficial}', covering all real 
property, together with all improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all 
easements, appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property, owned by Trustor 
arid encumbered by the Deed of Trust, which real property is located in Summit County, Uiah, 
and is more particularly described as follows (the "Property"): 
LOT 3, DUTCH DRAW AT CANYON ESTATES SUBDIVISION, PAPJC 
CITY, UTAH, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON FILE 
IN THE OFFICE OF THE SUMMIT COUNTY RECORDER. 
Tax Sena] No. DDCE-3 
The properly address is purported to be 2350 West Red Pme Court, Park City, Utah 
84098. The undersigned disclaims any liability for errors m the address. 
For the purpose of paying obligations secured by said Deed of Trust including fees, charges and 
expenses of Trustee, advances, if any, under the terms of said Deed of Trust, interest thereon and 
the unpaid principal of the Note secured by said Deed of Trust with interest thereon as described 
in said Note and by law provided. 
The current beneficiary of the Deed of Trust is RJW MEDIA, INC.. a Texas corporation, and the 
record owner of the Property as of the recording of the Notice of Default was ALAN SQUIRES. 
rjr^ „„,__ 4 „„„^^A ^ ^ ^ ^.r 4-u^ T),-—.*>,-*,, .;„ o p v n i A C P TMJI TTDI rsvh/rwhVT T T O „ T T + . I . 
JL i i w w U i i v / i i i i ^ u i u VJVYJLJL^ i \J1 Li i^ JL J. \JjJ\^a Lj xo Ox X l\~) XJJTH~> >~> XSX~> Y X^J-yv/JL JLYJLJL-dL\ X , X-J . X-i. v_^  . , O. \J ICU.1 
limited liability company. 
The sale is subject to a bankruptcy filing, a payoff, a reinstatement or any other condition of 
which the Trustee is not aware that would cause the cancellation of the sale. If any such 
condition exits, the sale shall be void, the successful bidder's funds returned and the Trustee and 
current beneficiary shall not be liable to the successful bidder for any damage. 
Bidders must be prepared to tender to the Trustee a $5,000.00 cashier's check at the sale and the 
balance of the purchase pnee by 12:00 noon the day following the sale. The balance of the 
purchase price musl be in the form of a wire transfer, cashier's check or certified funds. 
DATED effective the ]2n da^  of Novembo 2004 
9LU~-
S Blake Panisli Successo] Trusiee 
WR0NA&PARR1SH,PC 
1816 Pi ospecior Avenue, Sune 100 
Paik City, Utali 84060 
Telephone (435)649-2525 
Office hours 8 30 a m 10 5 30 p m 





A 1 1 O li N 1 Y S A T L A W 
November 16,2004 
CIT Group/Consumer Finance, Inc. 
2030 E. Flamingo Road, Suite 100 
Las Vegas, NV 89119 
CIT Group/Consumer Finance, Inc. 
PO Box 630 
Marlton,NJ 08053-3941 
RE: Notice of Trustee's Sale 
Lot 3 Dutch Draw at Canyon Estates Subdivision; Tax Serial No. DDCE-3 
2350 West Red Pine Court, Park City, Utah 84098 
To Whom It May Concern: 
Enclosed please find a Notice of Trustee's Sale regarding the above referenced property 
currently scheduled for December 13, 2004 at 11:00 a.m. 
Sincerely, 
Brian Joyce 
Enclosure: Notice of Trustee's Sale 
* Park Citv. Utah 84060 * Phone 435.649.2525 * Fax 435.649.5959 * ww.wasatchlaw.com 
TabK 
WRONA 6 PARRISH 
Novembei ] 8, 2004 
VIA FACSIMILE- (405) 553-4702 
Dale Coolc 
Loss Mitigation Team Coordinator 
CIT Group 
7155 Metropolitan Drive 
Oklahoma City, OK 73108 
Dear Mr. Cook: 
As you know, I represent Robert and John Werra with regard to that certain residential 
real estate located at 2350 West Red Pme Court, Park City, Utah 84098. My clients have 
purchased the $2.3 million Deed of Trust previously held by IndyMac and have noticed a 
foreclosure sale foi December 13, 2004. It is our intention to conduct the foreclosure sale and 
clean off all encumbrances to the property. 
If the foreclosure sale occurs, CIT Group will recover nothing on its deed of trust against 
the property. My clients are willing to pay CIT $20,000 to purchase CRTs Deed of Trust and 
alleviate the need for the foreclosure sale. This offei may only be accepted upon CIT's 
execution of the attached Note Sale and Purchase Agreement on or before the close of business 
on Tuesday, November 23, 2004. CIT may accept this offer only by signing the Note Sale and 
Purchase Agreement and return faxing the signed Agreement to my office on or before the 
deadline foi acceptance. Upon receipt of the signed Agreement, I wil] instruct the Werras lo 
wire $20,000.00 to CIT's account; accordingly, please provide mc with wiring instructions. 
Thank you very much foi yom piompt attention to this mallei. 
Very truly yours, 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




THE CIT GROUP/CONSUMER 
FINANCE, INC., a Delaware 
corporation; WESTLAND TITLE 
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, d/b/a 
LINCOLN TITLE INSURANCE 
AGENCY; and FIRST SOUTHWESTERN 
TITLE AGENCY OF UTAH, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendants. ! 
RULING and ORDER 1 
J 
Case No. 050500373 J 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
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The above matter came before the Court on September 18, 2006 
for oral argument on several motions. 
Plaintiff was present through Joseph E. Wrong/Tyler S. 
Foutz, defendants CIT Group and Westland Title were present 
through Dana T. Farmer, and First Southwestern Title was present 
through Mark S. Middlemas. 
The following motions were considered: 
1. Plaintiff RJW Media, Inc.'s ("RJW" or "Plaintiff") motion 
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for summary judgment and Defendant The CIT Group/Consumer 
Finance, Inc.'s ("CIT" or "Defendant") cross-motion for summary 
judgment; 
Plaintiff filed this motion for summary judgment on May 5, 
2006 and CIT filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on May 31, 
2006. CIT filed an opposition response on May 31, 2006 and 
Plaintiff filed an opposition response on June 9, 2006. 
Plaintiff filed a reply on June 2, 2006 and CIT filed a reply on 
June 21, 2006. A request to submit was filed by Plaintiff on 
July 7, 2006 and by CIT on August 10, 2006. 
2. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and Southwestern 
Jitle's cross motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiff filed this motion for summary judgment on May 5, 
2006 and Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on 
May 25, 2006. Defendant filed an opposition response on May 25, 
2006 and Plaintiff filed an opposition response on June 12, 2006. 
Plaintiff filed a reply on June 7, 2006 and Defendant filed a 
reply on June 22, 2006. A request to submit was filed by 
Plaintiff on July 7, 2006 and by Defendant on July 18, 2006. 
-2-
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3. Southwestern Title's motion for allocation of fees. 
Southwestern Title filed this motion July 21, 2006. 
Plaintiff filed an opposition response August 4, 2006. 
Southwestern Title filed a reply and request to submit August 11, 
2006. 
Oral argument was scheduled and held on September 18, 2006. 
The Court took the matter under advisement. 
The Court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the 
entire file, heard oral argument, and concludes as follows. 
1. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND CITfS CROSS MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
BACKGROUND 
It appears to the Court that the following facts are 
undisputed. On January 24, 2001, certain property in Park City 
(the '"Property") was encumbered by a deed of trust ("IndyMac 
Trust Deed") executed in favor of IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. 
("IndyMac"). Subsequently, the Property was encumbered by a 
-3-
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second deed of trust executed in favor of CIT. In July 2004, 
IndyMac assigned its note relating to the Property to RJW. RJW 
thereafter performed a title search on the Property and 
discovered a Notice of Default had been recorded. Soon after, 
First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, the trustee of the 
IndyMac Trust Deed, issued a Cancellation of Notice of Default 
("Cancellation of Default"). RJW did not become aware that a 
Cancellation of Default had been filed until after it had 
foreclosed on the Property. CIT, however, became aware of the 
Cancellation of Default on November 9, 2004. 
On November 12, 2004, Blake Parrish, the new trustee of the 
IndyMac Trust Deed, issued a Notice of Trustee's Sale of the 
Property ("Notice of Sale"). The Notice of Sale complied with 
all statutory requirements and stated that the Property would be 
sold at the Summit County Courthouse on December 13, 2004 at 
11:00 a.m. 
On November 16, 2004, RJW mailed notice of the sale 
("Trustee's Sale") to CIT. Two days later, RJW mailed another 
letter to CIT informing it that the Trustee's Sale was noticed 
for December 13, 2004 and that RJW was willing to purchase CIT's 
trust deed in advance of the sale. RJW indicated in the letter 
-4-
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that it intended to conduct the foreclosure sale and clean off 
all encumbrances to the Property. 
CIT received the Notice of Sale and offer from RJW to 
purchase its trust deed, but CIT never responded to RJW s letter 
and never informed RJW about the Cancellation of Default or that 
CIT believed the impending Trustee's Sale would be invalid. On 
December 13, 2004, the Trustee's Sale was conducted in accordance 
with the Notice of Sale. CIT did not attend the Trustee's Sale 
and RWJ purchased the Property as the highest bidder. 
Following the Trustee's Sale, CIT received notice that the 
Trustee's Sale had in fact occurred. CIT did not take any action 
until April 2005, when it began the process of foreclosing on its 
own trust deed on the Property. On July 20, 2005, RJW filed the 
current action to, inter alia, enjoin CIT from proceeding with 
its foreclosure and for a declaratory judgment stating that RJW 
has title in fee simple to the Property free of any adverse 
claims from CIT. 
On August 31, 2005, RJW filed a motion for temporary 
restraining order and preliminary injunction asking the Court to 
enjoin CIT's scheduled foreclosure of the Property. The Court 
granted a temporary restraining order that would remain in effect 
-5-
until further order. The Court now has before it RJWs motion for 
summary judgement and CIT's cross-motion for summary judgment. 
ARGUMENTS 
CIT claims that the Trustee's Sale that took place on 
December 13, 2004 was invalid because the Cancellation of Default 
had been recorded and therefore the statutory requirements for 
the sale were not met. Conversely, RJW claims that CIT is 
estopped from arguing the Trustee's Sale was invalid because CIT 
had notice the sale was going forward, but did not object or take 
any action to stop the sale. 
RJW claims in its motion for summary judgment that the 
undisputed facts show that CIT had actual notice of the Trustee's 
Sale and that it is estopped from objecting to the sale because 
CIT consciously chose to remain silent about the alleged 
procedural defect of the sale and allowed the sale to go forward. 
Alternatively, RJW argues that CIT has waived its right to object 
to the procedural defects of the sale. RJW relies on American 
Falls Canal Sec. Co. V. American Savings and Loan Assrn for the 
proposition that a party who acquiesces in a foreclosure 
proceeding may be estopped from objecting to irregularities in 
-6-
the proceeding. Pursuant to American Falls, RJW contends that 
CIT's acquiescence in the foreclosure proceeding estops it from 
objecting to the validity of the sale. 
In further support of its argument, RJW alleges that the 
Cancellation of Default was simply a technical irregularity and 
that allegations of technical defects are insufficient to set 
aside a trustee's sale. A notice of default is a notice 
requirement and if the objective of the notice requirement is 
met, then defects in the notice will not affect the validity of 
the sale. The objective of the notice requirement is to inform 
persons with an interest in the property of the pending sale. 
Because CIT had notice of the sale, this objective was met and 
the sale was valid. 
RJW also contends that CIT cannot assert protection under 
Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-24 because the statute only protects 
debtors, not beneficiaries. Because CIT is not a debtor, it 
cannot object to the sale based on noncompliance with § 57-1-24. 
CIT filed an opposition to RJW's motion as well as a cross-
motion for summary judgment on May 31, 2006. CIT claims that 
contrary to RJW's claims, American Falls stands for the 
proposition that estoppel and waiver may only be used where there 
l)UG4d? 
is sufficient conduct by the party to be estopped. In American 
Falls, the lender relied on extensive and affirmative conduct by 
the party that was estopped. In the current matter, CIT's only 
conduct was silence and RJW cannot claim reliance on CIT's 
silence because RJW should have easily discovered the 
Cancellation of Default by doing an updated title search. 
CIT further contends that the Cancellation of Default voided 
the trustee's authority to conduct the Trustee's Sale and 
therefore estoppel and waiver cannot be used to validate a void 
sale. CIT agrees that every notice defect and sale irregularity 
does not make the sale void, but contends that the test for 
whether a sale is void is whether the defect or irregularity 
would have the effect of chilling the bidding or causing an 
inadequacy of the price. CIT contends that the Cancellation of 
Default would have chilled the bidding and resulted in an 
inadequate price because the consequence of the Cancellation of 
Default was that there was no notice at all. 
CIT also reasons that the Cancellation of Default would have 
chilled bidding because people would either not attend the sale 
or not bid because the quality of title would be uncertain. For 
support, CIT points to the trustee's deposition where the trustee 
-8-
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admitted that a reasonable conclusion for someone who saw the 
Cancellation of Default is that the sale would not be valid. The 
trustee also admitted that the sale may be invalid for those who 
did not have actual notice that the sale was moving forward 
despite the Cancellation of Default. 
CIT also contends that it acted reasonably by not bidding 
because if it had bid and won, it risked losing title to the 
Property because of the defective notice. The purpose of the 
notice system is to allow parties to rely on the predictability 
of the statutory notice process. If notice is effective even 
when the statute is not complied with, then the continuity and 
uniformity of the statutory process is harmed. Therefore, CIT 
was entitled to rely on the record at the County Recorder's 
office and the deficient notice voided the sale. 
RJW filed a reply memorandum to CIT's opposition on June 2, 
2006, as well as an opposition memorandum to CIT's cross-motion 
on June 9, 2006. RJW responds that estoppel may not only stem 
from a party's actions, but may also stem from a party's 
inactions. Because CIT received actual notice from RJW that the 
Trustee's Sale was moving forward and failed to take any action 
to stop the sale, CIT is now estopped from contesting the sale. 
.9. 
OU043S 
RJW further argues that CIT has not met its burden to show 
that bidding may have been chilled and that the price was 
inadequate. CIT has not contended that the price was inadequate 
nor has it produced evidence that the bidding was chilled. It is 
insufficient to allege that bidding may have been chilled, but 
one must show that the bidding was actually chilled. CIT has 
failed to do so. 
On June 21, 2006, CIT filed a reply memorandum to RJW's 
opposition memorandum. CIT argues that by arguing estoppel and 
waiver, RJW has conceded that the Trustee's Sale was void. 
Because the sale was void, it cannot be validated by the 
equitable principles of waiver and estoppel. Nonjudicial 
foreclosures are governed exclusively by statute and if the 
statute is not complied with, the trustee has no power to conduct 
a sale, even in equity. Therefore, estoppel and waiver cannot be 
used to validate the sale. 
CIT also argues that it is not required to show that the 
bidding was in fact chilled, but simply that the Cancellation of 
Default would have the effect of chilling the bidding. CIT 
distinguishes RJW's cited cases on the basis that all of them 
deal with defects in the notice of sale and not with defects in 
-10-
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the notice of default. This distinction is important because the 
notice of default is what gives the trustee the statutory 
authority to conduct the sale. Without a valid notice of default, 
the trustee has no authority to conduct a valid sale. 
DISCUSSION 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits, and other submissions reflect no genuine 
issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56©). The purpose 
of summary judgment "is to eliminate the time, trouble and 
expense of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as 
asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to 
prevail." Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). 
A non-moving party who bares the burden of proof at trial must 
produce evidence sufficient to meet each element of their claim 
to preclude the entry of summary judgment. Sarins v. Butterfield 
Ford, 94 P.3d 301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). Bare contentions, 
unsupported by any specification of facts, are not enough. 
Massey v. Utah Power & Light Co., 609 P.2d 937 (Utah 1980). 
"Ordinarily, the issues of waiver and estoppel involve 
-11-
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questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact. Where, 
however, the facts and circumstances are admitted or clearly 
established and where only one inference may reasonably be drawn 
from the evidence . . . waiver and estoppel become questions of 
law." Am. Falls Canal Sec. Co. v. Am. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 775 
P.2d 412, 415 (Utah 1989). The parties do not dispute the 
essential facts in this matter and therefore summary judgment is 
appropriate. 
The issue to be resolved is whether CIT's conduct estops1 it 
from objecting to irregularities regarding the notice of default. 
"Equitable estoppel requires proof of three elements: (I) a 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party 
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action 
or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the basis of 
the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; 
and (iii) injury2 to the second party that would result from 
1
 In addition to estoppel, RJW also argues that CIT waived 
its right to object to any irregularities in the Trustee's Sale 
and that even if it had not, the statute only protects debtors, 
not beneficiaries. Because the Court holds that RJW's estoppel 
claim is dispositive, the Court does not address RJW's waiver or 
standing claim. 
2CIT does not, at least expressly, dispute that RJW would be 
injured if CIT was now allowed to set aside the Trustee's Sale. 
-12-
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allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act." Nunley v. Westates 
Casing Servs., 1999 UT 100, 5 34, 989 P.2d 1077. Utah law is 
clear that the principles of estoppel may apply in the context of 
nonjudicial foreclosures. See Am. Falls Canal Sec. Co. v. Am. 
Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 775 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1989) ("The 
principles of waiver and estoppel have application in determining 
the rights of parties to foreclosure sales.); Occidental Neb. 
Fed. Sav. Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
("While such estoppel principles are most often applied in 
judicial actions, the facts and circumstances surrounding a 
nonjudicial foreclosure make the situations sufficiently 
similar."). 
CIT first argues that estoppel cannot apply to it because 
there was not sufficient conduct on its part. CIT distinguishes 
RJW's primary case, American Falls, based on the fact that the 
party's affirmative conduct in American Falls was more extensive 
than CIT's silent acquiescence. Although CIT successfully shows 
that its conduct is not as extensive as the affirmative conduct 
In any case, RJW would clearly be injured if it was required to 
go through the time and expense of another trustee's sale based 
on CIT's objection. 
-13-
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present in American Falls, it fails to show that its conduct was 
not sufficient for estoppel to apply. Estoppel not only applies 
to affirmative action such as in American Falls, but it also 
applies where there is failure to take action. See Nunley, 1999 
UT at 5 34 (listing failure to act as a way to satisfy the first 
element of estoppel); Am. Falls Canal Sec. Co., 775 P.2d at 414 
("A mortgagor by acquiescence and failure to assert his rights at 
the proper time may well be estopped to set up irregularities in 
the foreclosure proceedings to defeat rights of the purchaser.") 
(citation omitted)(emphasis added). 
It is undisputed that CIT acquiesced in the Trustee's Sale. 
CIT does not dispute that it was fully aware that the 
Cancellation of Default had been recorded and that it therefore 
had grounds to object to the sale.3 CIT assumes that its only 
option was to purchase the Property and therefore risk not having 
good title. Clearly, however, this was not CIT's only 
alternative. CIT was free to object to the sale based on the 
3CIT's argument that RJW could have easily discovered the 
Cancellation of Default misses the point. The relevant conduct 
for whether CIT should be estopped is CIT's conduct, not RJW s 
conduct. Regardless of whether RJW should have done an updated 
title search, the fact remains that CIT knew about the 
Cancellation of Default and chose to allow the Trustee's Sale to 
proceed without objection. 
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Cancellation of Default and ask the Court to enjoin the Trustee's 
Sale from taking place. Indeed, this is precisely the action RJW 
has taken with regard to CIT"s attempted foreclosure. However, 
rather than object or inform the trustee or RJW that it believed 
that the proposed sale would be invalid, CIT silently allowed the 
Trustee's Sale to take place. When CIT acquiesced in the sale 
with full knowledge of the Cancellation of Default, it gave up 
its right to later object after that sale had been completed. 
CIT argues that nevertheless the Trustee's Sale must be set 
aside because the Cancellation of Default voided the sale. 
Although CIT concedes that not every defective notice and 
irregularity in a trustee's sale makes the sale void, CIT is also 
correct that where noncompliance results in a "complete legal 
nullity," the sale should be set aside. 
Notice defects or irregularities that would allow for 
setting aside a trustee's sale must be those "that would have the 
effect of chilling the bidding and causing an inadequacy of 
price." Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, % 36, 86 P.3d 699 (quoting 
Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Servs., Inc., 1 A3 P.2d 
1158, 1159 (Utah 1987). The reason for this requirement is that 
the "statutes regulating nonjudicial sales of property secured by 
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trust deeds are intended to protect the interests of the 
trustor/debtor in having the property sold for a fair price." 
Thomas v. Johnson, 801 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). If 
this objective is not met, then the trustee's sale should be set 
aside. Conversely, if this objective has been satisfied, then 
"immaterial errors and mistakes will not affect the sufficiency 
of the notice or the sale made pursuant thereto." Timm, 2003 UT 
at 31 36. However, the remedy of setting aside a trustee's sale 
should only be applied in cases that reach unjust extremes. 
Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1159. 
CIT has failed to offer any evidence that the statute's 
objective was not met or that the Cancellation of Default 
resulted in chilled bidding or an inadequate price.4 CIT argues 
that it is not required to produce affirmative evidence of 
chilled bidding, but the cases indicate otherwise. See Concepts, 
743 P.2d at 1159 ("Defendant's statement that the incorrect date 
had the potential to mislead prospective bidders is insufficient 
to conclude that it in fact did."); Occidental/Neb. Fed. Sav. 
4
 The parties dispute whether the requirement to show chilled 
bidding or an inadequacy of price is conjunctive or disjunctive. 
This Court need not decide this issue since CIT has failed to 




Bank, 791 P.2d at 221 ("there was no evidence presented that the 
inaccurate description of the property . . . had any chilling 
effect on the bidding or resulted in an inadequate bid."). 
Moreover, even if CIT was correct that it does not have to 
provide evidence that the bidding was in fact chilled or resulted 
in an inadequate price, the Court does not find that the 
Cancellation of Default would potentially lead to such a result. 
If an individual discovered a Cancellation of Default had been 
recorded, but also discovered a Notice of Sale indicating that a 
trustee's sale was going to be held, it is unlikely that the 
individual would simply assume that the resulting sale would be 
invalid and do nothing more. At a minimum, the individual would 
call the trustee to inquire further as to the discrepancy. CIT's 
argument that there could be a number of individuals who would 
have chosen not to bid at the Trustee's Sale because they 
believed it was invalid is unconvincing. 
CIT also attempts to avoid the reach of Utah cases using 
estoppel in nonjudicial foreclosure actions by distinguishing 
between a defect in the notice of default and a defect in the 
notice of sale. CIT argues that the Utah cases using estoppel in 
nonjudicial foreclosure actions deal with defects in the notice 
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of sale, not the notice of default, as is the case here. Using 
this distinction, CIT contends that the equitable principle of 
estoppel cannot be used where there is a defect in the notice of 
default because the trustee has no power to conduct a sale until 
a valid notice of default is given. 
CIT's argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, 
there is nothing in the plain language of § 57-1-24 that 
indicates a defect in the notice of default will void a sale, but 
a defect in the notice of sale will not. In fact, the statute 
not only preconditions a trustee's exercise of his power of sale 
on getting a notice of default filed, but it also preconditions 
the exercise of the power on getting a notice of sale filed as 
well. See § 57-1-24(3) ("after the lapse of at least three 
months the trustee shall give notice of sale . . . " ) . If CIT's 
reasoning is correct, then a defect in the notice of sale would 
also void the sale. However, this is not the case under Utah law 
and CIT has failed to give any persuasive reason why a deficient 
notice of default should be treated differently than a deficient 
notice of sale for purposes of the validity of the sale. 
Secondly, at least one Utah case has involved a deficient 
notice of default and the court applied the same standards used 
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with a deficient notice of sale. In Occident/Nebraska Federal 
Savings Bank, the Utah Court of Appeals held that an incomplete 
description of the property in the notice of default did not void 
the sale because the notice of default still provided sufficient 
notice and met the objectives of the statute. 791 P.2d at 220-
21. Therefore, CIT's attempt to find a relevant distinction 
between a notice of default and a notice of sale is unsupported 
both by the plain language of the statute and Utah case law. 
Finally, CIT argues that allowing a valid sale to be based 
on a deficient notice of default will create a "shadow notice 
system" that will eliminate the predictability and uniformity of 
the statutory notice system. .Contrary to CIT's contention, using 
the principles of estoppel does not establish a "shadow notice 
system" nor does it affect the predictability of the notice 
system. Parties continue to be obligated to comply with the 
statutory requirements for nonjudicial foreclosures. However, 
"[t]he purpose of strict notice requirements in a nonjudicial 
sale of property secured by trust deed is to inform persons with 
an interest in the property of the pending sale of that property, 
so that they may act to protect those interests." Timm, 2003 UT 
at 5 36. Where a party receives notice of the pending sale and 
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has an opportunity to protect its interests by objecting to the 
sale, but chooses instead to silently allow the sale to take 
place, equity will not allow that party to complain about the 
known defect after the sale is complete. This equitable 
principle does not affect the predictability of the statutory 
process, but simply prevents a party from complaining about a 
defective notice when the party had all the notice it needed to 
protect its rights. 
The Court has examined the rest of CIT's arguments and finds 
them to be unpersuasive. Because CIT acquiesced in the Trustee's 
Sale despite having actual notice of the Cancellation of Default 
and the opportunity to protect its interests in the property, CIT 
is estopped from asserting noncompliance with the statute based 
on the Cancellation of Default. 
Therefore, for the above reasons, the Court GRANTS RJW's 
motion for summary judgment and DENIES CIT's cross-motion for 
summary judgment. 
The court believes this goes only to the declaratory and 
injunctive relief claims. Neither party briefed the title claims 
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and the court believes the slander of title claim was dismissed 
against Southwestern Title but not against CIT. 
2. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SOUTHWESTERN 
TITLE'S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
BACKGROUND 
On January 24, 2001, certain property in Park City (the 
"Property") was encumbered by a deed of trust ("IndyMac Trust 
Deed") executed in favor of IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. ("IndyMac"). 
Subsequently, the debtor defaulted on the IndyMac Trust Deed and 
IndyMac Bank caused a notice of default (the "Notice of Default") 
to be recorded On October 8, 2003. On July 28, 2004, RJW entered 
into an agreement (the "Assignment Agreement") with Deutsche Bank 
National Trust Company ("Deutsche Bank") whereby, inter alia, the 
beneficial interest of the IndyMac Trust Deed was transferred to 
RJW. The Assignment Agreement prohibited Deutsche from pursuing 
any collection efforts under the loan and contained an 
indemnification provision whereby RJW agreed to hold Deutsche and 
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its directors, officers, employees, attorneys and agents harmless 
from any claims that arose in connection with the subject of the 
transaction. 
At the time RJW purchased the IndyMac Trust Deed, 
Southwestern Title was the record trustee. On August 9, 2006, 
RJW recorded an Assignment of Trust Deed (the "Assignment Deed") 
stating that Deutsche Bank was assigning its beneficial rights 
and interest in the IndyMac Trust Deed to RJW. At the top of the 
Assignment Deed, the following notation was inscribed: 
After recording mail to: 
First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc. 
102 West 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Despite the notation, the parties dispute where the 
Assignment Deed was mailed after recording. Southwestern Title 
contends that the deed was sent to RJW's attorneys and offers the 
policy and records of the Summit County Recorder as proof. RJW 
relies on the notation as evidence that the Assignment Deed was 
sent to Southwestern Title. IndyMac never informed Southwestern 
Title about the assignment and RJW did not inform Southwestern 
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Title about the assignment until November 16, 2004. 
On September 22, 2004, pursuant to instructions from 
Deutsche Bank, Southwestern Title recorded a Cancellation of 
Notice of Default ("Cancellation of Default"). The parties 
dispute whether Southwestern Title was aware that RJW was the 
beneficiary at the time the Cancellation of Default was recorded. 
Southwestern Title did not obtain a title update before recording 
the Cancellation of Default or inquire as to whether the default 
had actually been cured because it was not an industry standard 
to do either of these things. 
On December 13, 2004, a trustee's sale was held on the 
IndyMac Trust Deed. Several months later, The CIT Group/Consumer 
Finance, Inc. ("CIT"), who was a beneficiary on a second trust 
deed on the Property, informed RJW that it considered the 
trustee's sale invalid because of the Cancellation of Default. 
CIT then recorded its own notice of default and RJW filed this 
action on July 20, 2005 to enjoin CIT from foreclosing on the 
Property. 
In addition to filing suit against CIT, RJW also sued 
Southwestern Title for slander of title and breach of duty. RJW 
subsequently agreed to the dismissal of its slander of title 
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claim. The Court now has before it RJWs motion for summary 
judgment and Southwestern Title's cross-motion for summary 
judgment. 
ARGUMENTS 
RJW claims in its motion for summary judgment that as 
trustee of the IndyMac Trust Deed, Southwestern Title owed RJW a 
duty to act "reasonably and in good faith," and at a minimum, 
this included complying with the provisions of the trust deed and 
the trust deed statute. The trust deed statute authorizes a 
cancellation of default only if the default is cured and the 
trust deed is reinstated. Because Southwestern Title failed to 
ensure that these two conditions were met, it breached its duty 
as a matter of law. 
Southwestern Title filed an opposition to RJW's motion as 
well as a cross-motion for summary judgment on May 25, 2006. 
Southwestern Title contends that Utah law treats breach of duty 
claims as negligence claims and that summary judgment is 
inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on its merits except 
in the most clear cut cases. It is not clear cut in this case 
because Southwestern Title did not know that RJW had become the 
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beneficiary when it followed Deutsche Bank's instructions to 
record the Cancellation of Default. 
Summary judgment is further inappropriate for RJW because it 
is not clear what standard of care should be applied. Where the 
standard of care is in question, summary judgment should not be 
granted unless the standard is fixed by law and reasonable minds 
could reach but one conclusion as to defendant's liability. 
Neither of these conditions are met. 
Moreover, summary judgment is inappropriate where, as here, 
there are questions as to reasonableness and good faith. 
Southwestern Title acted reasonably and in good faith because it 
had no way of knowing that RJW was the beneficiary and it had no 
statutory or industry obligation to question Deutsche Bank's 
instructions or obtain a title search before recording the 
Cancellation of Default. 
Finally, Southwestern Title contends that summary judgment 
is inappropriate because RJW has failed to provide any evidence 
that is has been harmed, other than its attorney fees incurred in 
this action. RJW cannot recover attorney fees because it has no 
contractual or statutory right to do sor and further, claims in 
negligence for economic loss such as attorney fees are barred by 
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the economic loss rule. 
Southwestern Title then argues that while summary judgment 
is inappropriate for RJW, summary judgment in favor of 
Southwestern Title should be granted as a matter of law. 
Southwestern Title contends that summary judgment should be 
granted because RJW cannot prove the breach of duty element of 
its claim. First, Southwestern Title's primary duty as a trustee 
was to ensure payment on the deed of trust and exercise the power 
of trustee's sale if the trustor defaults. RJW contends that the 
trustee's sale was valid and therefore, Southwestern Title has 
not breached its duty. 
Even if the sale was invalid, Southwestern Title acted 
reasonably under the circumstances because it was never informed 
that Deutsche Bank was no longer the beneficiary. RJW does not 
dispute that Southwestern Title acted in accordance with industry 
standards when it did not question Deutsche Bank's instructions 
to record the Cancellation of Default and therefore its actions 
were reasonable as a matter of law. 
Moreover, RJW should have known that a Cancellation of 
Default would be filed because the Assignment Agreement between 
RJW and Deutsche Bank required Deutsche Bank to cease all 
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collection efforts against the debtor. 
Southwestern Title contends that summary judgment should 
also be granted in its favor because RJW cannot show any harm 
that it incurred, other than attorney fees. Because RJW has no 
contractual or statutory right to collect attorney fees and 
because attorney fees are barred by the economic loss rule, RJW 
cannot prove any damages. In addition, RJW cannot recover 
attorney fees as special damages because special damages are only 
available in a slander of title claim and RJW dismissed its 
slander of title claim. 
Moreover, RJW failed to mitigate its damages and its damages 
are a result of its own failure. RJW and its attorneys failed to 
obtain an updated title report that would have revealed the 
Cancellation of Default and the successor trustee of the IndyMac 
Bank Trust Deed admits that it violated industry standards by not 
doing so. 
Finally, RJW cannot show harm because it agreed to hold 
Deusche Bank and its agents harmless in connection with the 
Property. As an agent of Deutsche Bank, Southwestern Title is 
covered by this provision in the Assignment Agreement and 
therefore RJW cannot maintain this action against Southwestern 
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Title. 
RJW filed a reply memorandum on June 7, 2006, RJW responds 
that summary judgment is appropriate because the standard of care 
is fixed by the trust deed statute. The statute requires that a 
cancellation of notice of default only be recorded where the 
default is cured and the trust deed is reinstated. This gives a 
fixed standard of care that requires a trustee to verify that the 
default has been cured. Southwestern Title breached this duty 
and therefore summary judgment is appropriate. 
RJW also contends that RJW may recover attorney fees as 
special damages because they resulted in a cloud on RJW's title. 
The Cancellation of Default was the sole basis on which CIT 
claimed that the sale was invalid and Southwestern Title's 
actions in filing it were the direct cause of the litigation with 
CIT. 
RJW filed an opposition memorandum to Southwestern Title's 
cross-motion for summary judgment on June 12, 2006. RJW argues 
that summary judgment is inappropriate for Southwestern Title 
because a trustee has the statutory duty to ensure that the 
underlying default has been cured before the trustee may cancel 
the notice of default. Southwestern Title breached this duty by 
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failing to inquire whether the default had been cured. 
RJW also disputes that Southwestern Title was an agent of 
Deutsche Bank. To establish an agency relationship, Southwestern 
Title must show a fiduciary relationship with Deutsche Bank and 
it has failed to do so. Therefore, Southwestern Title is not 
protected by the terms of the Assignment Agreement. 
Finally, RJW contends that it did suffer harm from the 
Cancellation of Default because it placed a cloud on its title 
and therefore it can recover its attorney fees as special 
damages. In addition, both its actions and the successor 
trustee's actions were reasonable under the circumstances and 
therefore summary judgment cannot be granted based on a failure 
to mitigate. 
Southwestern Title filed a reply memorandum on June 22, 
2006. Southwestern Title contends that there is no issue of 
material fact as to whether Southwestern Title breached its duty 
because RJW has failed to provide any evidence disputing 
Southwestern Title's expert affidavits that Southwestern Title 
acted reasonably in light of industry standards. RJW has also 
failed to provide any evidence that Southwestern Title had notice 
that RJW was the beneficiary. 
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Southwestern Title also contends that it was clearly an 
agent for Deutsche Bank and therefore cannot be sued by RJW. 
Agency exists where a party acts on behalf of, and under the 
control of, a principal. Southwestern Title acted on behalf of 
Deutsche Bank and therefore RJW must hold it harmless under its 
Assignment Agreement with Deutsche Bank. 
Finally, Southwestern Title argues that RJW cannot prove it 
is entitled to special damages because special damages are only 
available under a slander of title claim. In addition, RJW 
failed to mitigate its damages. RJW has failed to submit any 
evidence disputing that industry standards require that the 
successor trustee update the title at the time he becomes 
successor trustee. The law is clear that a plaintiff has the 
duty to mitigate its damages and because RJW failed to do so, he 
cannot recover any damages arising from that failure. 
DISCUSSION 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits, and other submissions reflect no genuine 
issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. UTAH R. CIV. P. 56©) . The purpose 
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of summary judgment "is to eliminate the time, trouble and 
expense of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as 
asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to 
prevail." Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). 
A non-moving party who bares the burden of proof at trial must 
produce evidence sufficient to meet each element of their claim 
to preclude the entry of summary judgment. Sarins v. Butterfield 
Ford, 94 P.3d 301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
I. RJW's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Both parties agree that RJW s breach of duty claim should be 
treated as a negligence claim. See Wycalis v. Guardian Title of 
Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that the 
breach of duty claim by a beneficiary against a trustee amounted 
to a negligence claim). Both parties also agree that summary 
judgment should only be granted if the applicable standard of 
care is "fixed by law, and reasonable minds could reach but one 
conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under the 
circumstances." White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 
1994) (quoting Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 825). The parties dispute, 




M[T]he applicable standard of care in a given case may be 
established, as a matter of law, by legislative enactment or 
prior judicial decision." Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 825. Neither 
party points to any prior judicial decision as establishing the 
standard of care, but RJW contends a fixed standard of care is 
established by Utah Code Annotated §§ 57-1-24 and 57-1-31. 
Section 57-1-24 provides that a trustee may not exercise his 
power of sale until certain acts such as filing a notice of 
default and a notice of sale are completed. Section 57-1-31(1) 
details how an existing default may be cured. After detailing 
how a default may be cured, the provision states that "[a]fter 
the beneficiary or beneficiary's successor in interest has been 
5
 Southwestern Title seemingly argues against itself on the 
point. In its opposition memorandum, it contends that there is 
no standard of care fixed by law and that in the absence of a 
fixed standard of care, it is a question for the fact finder and 
therefore summary judgment cannot be granted. However, in its 
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, 
Southwestern Title contends that it met its primary duty under 
the trust deed statute and therefore its summary judgment motion 
should be granted. The implication of this second argument is 
that Southwestern Title does in fact believe the standard of care 
is fixed and that it met the appropriate standard. Although 
Southwestern Title is free to make inconsistent arguments such as 
this, the persuasiveness of both arguments are undermined as a 
result. 
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paid and the default cured, the obligation and trust deed shall 
be reinstated as if no acceleration had occurred." Subsection 
(2) then states that: 
[i]f the default is cured and the trust 
deed reinstated . . . the trustee shall execute, 
acknowledge, and deliver a cancellation of the 
recorded notice of default under the trustee 
deed; and any trustee who refuses to execute and 
record this cancellation within 30 days is 
liable to the person curing the default for all 
actual damages resulting from this refusal. 
RJW contends that these provisions require a trustee to do 
more than simply rely on a beneficiary's instructions to record a 
notice of cancellation of default, it requires that the trustee 
take some action to determine whether the default has actually 
been cured. 
However, there is nothing in the plain language of § 57-1-31 
that indicates what steps, if any, a trustee must take to ensure 
that the default has actually been cured. Although the statute 
states that a trustee is liable for refusing to record a notice 
of cancellation, the statute notably gives no penalties for a 
trustee that records a notice of cancellation where the default 
has not been cured. There is simply nothing in the plain language 
of the statute showing that the legislature intended to provide a 
standard of care that requires a trustee who has received 
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instructions from a beneficiary to cancel a notice of default to 
take affirmative action to determine if the default has actually 
been cured. Without something more, this Court is unwilling to 
find a fixed standard of care based on a statute that says 
nothing about a trustee's duty to verify that the default has 
been cured. 
This conclusion is supported by the decision in Wycalis. In 
Wycalis, a trustee reconveyed a trust deed to the trustor based 
on a forged request for reconveyance. 780 P.2d at 822-23. The 
trustee did not contact the beneficiary to verify her request nor 
did it require delivery of the original promissory note or trust 
deed. Id. at 823. The beneficiary sued the trustee claiming it 
had breached its duty by reconveying her trust deed based on the 
forged request. Id. 
One of the issues addressed by the court was whether a 
trustee standard of care had been fixed by the trust deed 
statute. Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 825. The beneficiary argued that 
§ 57-1-33 provided a fixed standard of care for a trustee.6 Id. 
at 826, n.7. The beneficiary relied on language in the provision 
that stated that "when the obligation secured by any trust deed 
6Section 57-1-33 was repealed in 1994.. 
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has been satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request by 
the beneficiary, reconvey the trust property." Id. The 
beneficiary contended that because the obligation had not been 
satisfied, the trustee breached its duty by reconveying the trust 
property based on the forged request. id. 
The court surmised that the beneficiary was essentially 
arguing that the statute subjected trustees to a strict liability 
standard. Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 826, n.7. The court then noted 
that the legislature had gone to great lengths in § 57-1-33 to 
define the duties of the beneficiary and the resulting liability 
for the breach of those duties, but failed to address any duties 
or resulting liabilities for a trustee who reconveyed property 
before the obligation was satisfied. Id. The court further 
stated that the language regarding the trustee was likely 
intended only as a procedural guide for trustees. Id. In light 
of these facts, the court concluded that it was unwilling to find 
a strict liability standard of care for trustees where the 
legislature did not expressly provide for one. Id. Because the 
court found no fixed standard of care provided by a legislative 
enactment or prior judicial opinion, th$ court held that summary 
judgment was inappropriate and that the standard of care should 
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be determined through fact finding. Id. 
The beneficiary's argument in Wycalis and RJW's argument are 
closely related and the reasoning applied to the statutory 
provision in Wycalis applies to the statutory provisions at issue 
here. As with the beneficiary in Wycalis, RJW wishes to find a 
fixed standard of care in a statutory provision that does not 
expressly purport to establish one. As with the court in 
Wycalis, this Court declines to find a fixed standard of care 
where there is insufficient evidence that a legislature intended 
to provide one. Because RJW has not offered any other evidence 
besides the statute for finding a fixed standard of care that 
would favor RJW, 
RJW's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 
II. Southwestern Title's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
The next issue before the Court is Southwestern Title's 
cross-motion for summary judgment. As discussed above, in the 
absence of a standard of care fixed by prior judicial opinion or 
legislative enactment, the standard of care is normally a factual 
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question that makes summary judgment inappropriate. Indeed, in 
Wycalis, the Utah Court of Appeals found there was no fixed 
standard of care for a trustee's duty in relation to a request 
for reconveyance and therefore reversed the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment and remanded the matter for the fact finder 
to determine the appropriate standard of care. 
The result from Wycalis would seem to compel the conclusion 
that Southwestern Title's cross-motion should also be denied 
since there is no fixed standard of care by prior judicial 
opinion or legislative enactment. However, there is one critical 
difference in this matter that distinguishes it from Wycalis. 
Unlike Wycalis, there is undisputed evidence of the industry 
standard of care in this case. 
In Wycalis, the court stated that the standard of care 
should be established factually, with an emphasis on standard-of-
care-in-the-industry evidence. 780 P.2d at 826. The court also 
indicated that expert testimony would be particularly helpful in 
delineating the appropriate standard of care. Id. at 826, n.8. 
Moreover, the Wycalis court stated that the matter was not 
"conducive to an yas a matter of law' determination, especially 
in the absence of uncontroverted standard-of-the-industry 
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evidence." Id. at 825 (emphasis added). Wycalis therefore left 
the door open for the possibility that summary judgment may be 
appropriate where a case involved "uncontroverted standard-of-
the-industry evidence." 
It appears that such uncontroverted evidence is present in 
this case. In Southwestern Title's statement of undisputed 
material facts, 1 15 states that "[Southwestern Title] did not 
obtain a title report before recording the [Cancellation of 
Default] because it is not an industry standard to do so." RJW 
wrote in response to this paragraph in its opposition memorandum, 
"Undisputed." 
Paragraph 16 of Southwestern Title's statement of undisputed 
material facts further states that "[i]t is not the custom or 
practice for a trustee to obtain a title report before recording 
a Cancellation of Notice of Default or to question the authority 
of the purported beneficiary." In response to this statement of 
fact, RJW responded "Disputed, insofar as the Trust Deed Statute 
imposes a clear duty upon a trustee to ensure that the debt 
underlying a trust deed has been paid and the default cured prior 
to a trustee's issuance of a cancellation of notice of default" 
(emphasis added). A plain reading of this response indicates 
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that RJW disputed the statement only to the extent that the trust 
deed statute imposes a duty to ensure the default has been cured. 
RJW apparently does not dispute that the custom or practice is 
not to question the authority of the purported beneficiary, but 
simply that the trust deed statute overrides the industry custom. 
As has already been discussed, RJW's argument that the trust 
deed statute provides such a duty has been rejected. Therefore, 
if it is true that RJW does not dispute that the industry trade 
or custom is not to obtain a title report when recording a notice 
of cancellation of default or question a purported beneficiary's 
authority to request such a recording, then there is no reason to 
send the matter to the fact finder to determine the industry 
trade or custom. 
Even if RJW does dispute that this is the industry trade or 
custom, RJW has offered no evidence to support this dispute. On 
the other hand, Southwestern Title has offered evidence to 
support its claim for what is the industry custom or practice. 
Southwestern Title provided an affidavit from Melven E. Smith 
("Mr. Smith"), the owner of Westland Title Insurance Agency. Mr. 
Smith states in his affidavit that he has "personally acted as a 
trustee in the foreclosure of thousands of Deeds of Trust" and 
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that it is not the practice in the industry to "question the 
instruction from the lender to cancel a Notice of Default" nor 
"is it the practice in the industry for a trustee to search title 
before recording" such a document. Southwestern Title also 
offers an affidavit from Kathy A. Davis ("Ms. Davis"), the 
manager of the foreclosure department for First American Title 
Insurance Agency. Ms. Davis states that in her experience, 
trustees follow instructions from the beneficiary to cancel a 
notice of default and that it is not First American's standard 
practice to search title before recording the cancellation 
notice. 
Southwestern Title's evidence as to the industry practice 
regarding the filing of a notice of cancellation of default 
places the burden on RJW to provide evidence to the contrary if 
it wishes to dispute the alleged industry practice. RJW, 
however, has failed to provide any such evidence. Because RJW 
seemingly does not dispute the industry practice is to accept 
instructions from a beneficiary to cancel a notice of default 
without making any further investigation, there is no need for 
the fact finder to determine the standard of care on this matter 
and it may properly be decided as a matter of law. 
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However, despite the undisputed evidence of the appropriate 
standard of care for a trustee recording a cancellation notice, 
if Southwestern Title had actual7 notice that Deutsche Bank was 
no longer the beneficiary, then summary judgment would be 
inappropriate. 
RJW's sole evidence that Southwestern Title had notice that 
RJW was the beneficiary is that the Assignment Deed stated that 
after it had been recorded, it should be sent to Southwestern 
Title.8 To dispute that it was sent to Southwestern Title, 
Southwestern Title offers correspondence from the Summit County 
Recorder stating that it is the policy of Summit County to return 
the original recorded document to the party that requested the 
recording, even if the face of the document expressly instructs 
7
 Although the recording of the Assignment Deed clearly 
allowed Southwestern Title the opportunity to discover that 
Deutsche Bank was no longer the beneficiary, as discussed above, 
the industry standard of care does not require a trustee to do an 
updated title search before recording a cancellation of default 
and therefore the fact that the Assignment Deed was recorded 
cannot be used to show Southwestern Title breached its duty. 
8RJW also states that it never received the recorded 
Assignment Deed, but it does not offer any evidence to support 
this claim. Moreover, Southwestern Title's evidence shows that 
Wrona & Parrish received it, not that RJW received it. Therefore 
RJW's unsupported contention that it never received the 
Assignment Deed is inapposite. 
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that the document be sent to another party. Southwestern Title 
also points to records from the Summit County Recorder's office 
that indicates that the Assignment Deed was to be sent to Wrona & 
Parrish PC and lists Wrona & Parrish PC's address. Finally, 
Southwestern Title offers deposition testimony that Southwestern 
Title never received the recorded document. 
The Court finds that in light of Summit County's stated 
policy of sending the recorded document back to the original 
party even where the document says to do otherwise,9 the Summit 
County records showing that the document was to be sent to Wrona 
& Parrish PC, and deposition testimony that Southwestern Title 
did not receive the Assignment Deed, the only reasonable 
inference is that Southwestern Title did not receive the 
Assignment Deed. Because the Assignment Deed is the only 
evidence that RJW offers to show Southwestern Title knew that 
Deutsche Bank was no longer the beneficiary, the Court finds that 
RJW has failed to create an issue of fact on whether Southwestern 
Title had notice. Since Southwestern Title did not have notice 
9
 Summit County will send a recorded document to an 
alternative party if there was a self-addressed stamped envelope 
to the alternative party, but RJW has not alleged that this was 
the case. 
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that Deutsche Bank was no longer the beneficiary and the industry 
standard of care did not require Southwestern Title to question 
Deutsche Bank's instructions or do an updated title search, 
Southwestern Title did not breach its duty as a trustee as a 
matter of law.10 
Therefore, for the above reasons, Southwestern Title's 
cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 
3. SOUTHWESTERN TITLE'S MOTION FOR ALLOCATION OF FEES. 
BACKGROUND 
On February 28, 2006, RJW responded to Southwestern Title's 
Request for Admission No. 2 and admitted that the original 
Assignment of Trust Deed recorded July 28, 2004 was returned to 
Wrona & Parrish and not Southwestern Title. Southwestern Title 
thereafter deposed S. Blake Parrish ("Mr. Parrish"), an attorney 
and trustee who worked at Wrona & Parrish. Southwestern Title 
Because the Court finds that Southwestern Title did not 
breach its duty as a matter of law, the Court does not address 
Southwestern Title's other arguments for summary judgment. 
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did not ask Mr. Parrish certain questions regarding the receipt 
of the Assignment of Trust Deed because the matter had been 
admitted. 
Subsequently, RJW filed a motion to withdraw its admission 
that Wrona & Parrish had received the Assignment of Trust Deed. 
After full briefing and oral argument, this Court granted RJWs 
motion to withdraw its admission and allowed the parties to do 
additional discovery in light of the Court's decision, but stated 
that NN[t]he court will not foreclose a request by [Southwestern 
Title] for allocation of cost and fees associated with this 
additional discovery required.'7 
Following this Court's decision, Southwestern Title served a 
Second Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production of 
Documents and Requests for Admissions ("Additional Discovery 
Request"). Southwestern Title now brings this motion to allocate 
the fees and costs incurred in drafting and serving its 
Additional Discovery Request and in bringing the current motion. 
ARGUMENTS 
Southwestern Title claims that it is entitled to its costs 
and fees incurred in drafting and serving its Additional 
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Discovery Request and its current motion because if RJW had not 
admitted it received the Assignment of Trust Deed and then 
withdrawn its admission, Southwestern Title would not have 
incurred these costs. RJW filed an opposition memorandum on 
August 4, 2006. RJW claims that Southwestern Title is not 
entitled to its costs and fees because RJW and Mr. Parrish saved 
time by voluntarily gathering and delivering additional documents 
to Southwestern Title in response to Southwestern Title's 
discovery requests. RJW also claims that Southwestern Title's 
Additional Discovery Request is "standard litigation fare and the 
very kinds of questions that chew up hours of deposition time." 
Southwestern Title filed a reply memorandum on August 11, 2006 
and disputed that RJW's manner of discovery saved any time or 
resources. 
DISCUSSION 
RJW essentially makes two arguments for why Southwestern 
Title should not receive its costs and fees incurred in its 
Additional Discovery Request and in bringing its motion. RJW 
first argues that Southwestern Title's motion has no relation to 
conducting the additional discovery. RJW secondly argues that 
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RJW and Mr. Parrish "voluntarily collected and delivered 
[additional responsive documents] to various discovery requests 
from [Southwestern Title]" and because Southwestern Title's 
Additional Discovery Request would have taken up hours of 
deposition time, Southwestern Title did not have to expend any 
extra time or resources.11 
Neither of these arguments, however, justify denying 
Southwestern Title's motion for costs and fees. Without RJW's 
mistaken admission, Southwestern Title would not have had to 
serve its Additional Discovery Request or bring this motion. 
Although RJW contends that the manner in which discovery 
proceeded actually saved time, it offers no evidence12 or 
persuasive argument that time was actually saved. This Court 
finds that Southwestern Title should not have to pay for RJW's 
pleading mistake. 
11
 RJW also contends that Mr. Parrish offered to collect 
documents for Southwestern Title's review, but Southwestern Title 
declined the offer. The Court finds this fact irrelevant since 
Southwestern Title was still relying on RJW's mistaken admission 
at the time it declined Mr. Parrish's offer. 
12
 Indeed, while RJW contends that "a review of [Southwestern 
Title's] supplemental discovery requests reveals that those 
requests are standard litigation fare and the very kinds of 
questions that chew up hours of deposition time," RJW does not 
attach a copy of the discovery requests or give any indication as 
to the content of the questions. 
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Therefore, for the above reasons, Southwestern Title's 
Motion for Allocation of Fees is GRANTED. 
The court finds that the amount of $537.50 for the costs and 
fees incurred in the Additional Discovery Request and in bringing 
the current motion is reasonable. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the Court and no other 
order is required. 
-> 7 
DATED this L/ day of September, 2006. 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RJW MEDIA, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE CIT GROUP, et.al., 
Defendants. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 050500373 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: April 18, 2007 
The above matter came before the court on April 16, 2001, 
for oral argument on CIT's (defendant's) motion for summary 
judgment. Plaintiff was present through Bastiaan K Coebergh and 
defendants CIT and Lincoln were present through Dana T. Farmer 
and Blake Hamilton. 
Defendant filed this motion on December 15, 2006, and the 
court allowed its filing in a ruling of February 9, 2007. 
Plaintiff moved to strike, but also filed an opposition response 
on January 4, 2007. Defendant filed a reply on January 12, 2007. 
As noted, based on a motion to strike by plaintiff and a motion 
to expand the filing deadlines, the court on February 9, 2007, 
ruled it would consider the motion for summary judgment. 
Accordingly, the court scheduled oral argument which was held. 
Oral argument was held and the court took the issues under 
advisement. Before the hearing the court carefully considered the 
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since 
taking the issues under advisement, the court has further 
considered the law and facts relating to the issues. Now being 
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fully advised, the court renders the following Ruling and Order. 
BACKGROUND 
The court has issued several arguments and motions on this 
case in the past and issued several rulings. 
ARGUMENTS 
Defendant CIT alleges that the third cause of action by 
plaintiff for slander of title should be dismissed. CIT claims 
as undisputed facts that the property at issue is at 2350 West 
Red Pine Court in Summit County. On January 24, 2001, a first 
deed of trust, the IndyMac Trust Deed encumbered the property. 
On August 30, 2002, a second deed of trust in favor of defendant, 
the CIT Trust Deed, encumbered the property. On April 28, 2003, 
the debtor stopped making payments on the note that was secured 
by the CIT Trust Deed. IndyMac issued a Notice of Default and 
that note was assigned to plaintiff on July 28, 2004. On 
September 22, 2004, First Southwestern Title Agency, the trustee 
of the IndyMac Trust Deed, issued a notice of cancellation of 
default. On November 9, 2004, defendant first became aware of the 
cancellation. On November 12, 2004, Parrish, the new trustee of 
the IndyMac Trust Deed, issued a notice of trustee's sale. On 
November 19, 2004, defendant learned for the firs time that the 
IndyMac note had been assigned to plaintiff. Defendant learned 
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of the cancellation from an updated title report, which showed no 
new notice of default. CIT asked that the situation be monitored 
so if a new notice of default was filed CIT could answer. 
Because the notice of cancellation was filed the December 13, 
2004, sale would be invalid in defendant's thinking and 
defendant's second deed of trust would still be in effect, so CIT 
determined to do nothing to halt the sale. Plaintiff conducted 
the sale December 13, 2004, and plaintiff was the highest bidder. 
After the sale defendant was given notice of the sale. Defendant 
was waiting to file its notice of default because it assumed 
plaintiff would discover the notice of default had been cancelled 
and they would restart the foreclosure process by filing a notice 
of default and plaintiff would come to realize the sale was 
invalid. CIT then filed its own notice of default. 
From these facts defendant argues plaintiff cannot meet its 
burden to show slander of title against CIT based on CIT's filing 
of the notice of default in April 2005. To prove slander of 
title plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) publication, (2) a 
false statement, (3) with malice, and (4) special damages. For 
purposes of this motion CIT concedes the first and fourth element 
can be proven by plaintiff. Plaintiff in its complaint alleges 
that the trustee sale eliminated the CIT Trust Deed and the 
recording of the Notice of Default by CIT constitutes a slander 
of plaintiff's title. 
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Defendant urges that the notice of default was not a false 
statement. Here, it is undisputed that the note secured by the 
CIT Trust Deed was in default, and so the notice of default was 
factually true. It was not a false claim against the property. 
Plaintiff seems to allege the notice was factually correct but 
legally incorrect, or false. However, when plaintiff filed its 
motion for summary judgment, it sought not a legal remedy under 
slander but an equitable remedy of estoppel. Plaintiff thus has 
elected its remedy, and plaintiff may not seek to stop CIT from 
enforcing its trust deed and also pursue damages on the legal 
basis that the sale was valid. Equitable remedies may only be 
awarded after legal remedies have been exhausted. Plaintiff has 
obtained its equitable remedy and so may not now seek a legal 
remedy. 
Further, as to the third element needed to prove slander fo 
title, the notice filed by defendant was not filed with malice. 
Malice may be shown by affirmative proof or by implication. 
Malice may be implied only if a party knowingly and wrongfully 
records or publishes something untrue or spurious or which gives 
a false impression adverse to one's title under circumstances 
that the party should reasonably foresee might result in damage 
to the property owner. There must be an intent to do a harmful 
act without a reasonable justification or excuse. Here, CIT 
acted reasonably in believing that because plaintiff's notice of 
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default had been cancelled, any sale would be invalid, and 
defendant believed plaintiff would discover that and remedy it, 
and recommence foreclosure by filing a new notice of default, and 
when that was not done after waiting five months defendant 
recorded its notice of default. All of the actions of CIT were 
premised on the belief that the sale was invalid, which plaintiff 
conceded previously on another motion for summary judgment. CIT 
acted in good faith to protect its interests and the actions were 
thus not false or malicious. 
In opposition plaintiff asserts defendant filed its notice 
with full knowledge that the trustee sale had occurred, knowing 
plaintiff never attempted to re-foreclose, and knowing the sale 
had not been set aside. Defendant knew or should have known the 
sale extinguished CIT's interest in the property. 
Plaintiff does not dispute any of the facts defendant set 
forth, but added as additional facts that plaintiff sent notice 
on November 16, 2004, that it was going to conduct the trustee 
sale on December 13, 2004, and a second letter dated November 18, 
2004 was sent to CIT informing its Loss Coordinator of the sale. 
CIT did nothing. CIT did not appear at the sale, and the sale 
was properly noticed. CIT did nothing after the sale except on 
its own decide the sale was invalid and filed on April 22, 2005, 
its own notice of default. Plaintiff requested that CIT remove 
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the notice and defendant did not respond so this lawsuit 
followed. The notice has still not been withdrawn. 
There is thus a factual dispute about intent. When viewed 
in the light most favorable to plaintiff the notice of default 
filed by CIT constituted a false representation. CIT acquiesced 
in the sale by not appearing or challenging the sale in any way, 
and that sale is presumed regular unless the opponent of the sale 
produces evidence to the contrary. A notice of default is filed 
to declare a breach of an obligation for which the property was 
conveyed as security and that the trustee has the right to 
foreclose. Defendant's interest has been extinguished by the 
sale and defendant had no rightful interest in the property when 
it filed its notice of default. In fact as a matter of law the 
notice is a false statement and there is certainly a factual 
dispute about the intent surrounding the filing. This court has 
ruled CIT cannot challenge the sale on the basis of a technical 
irregularity that was known to CIT at the time of the sale. The 
law of the case does not favor defendant but plaintiff. 
Malice may be proven by implication and there is a factual 
dispute about whether the notice was filed with malice. If a 
party knowingly and wrongfully records something untrue which 
gives a false or misleading impression adverse to the title of 
another under circumstances the recording party should reasonably 
foresee might result in damage, malice has been shown. 
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Further, defendant failed to address the damage element of 
slander of title claims and so there necessarily is a factual 
dispute remaining. 
The legal remedy is not inconsistent with the equitable 
remedy obtained. The doctrine of election of remedies requires a 
showing that two or more coexisting remedies exist, they are 
alternative and inconsistent, and a decision between inconsistent 
remedies must be made. The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent 
double redress where the remedies for a single wrong are 
exclusive and inconsistent. The choice of one remedy does not 
reject the other. Plaintiff here sought to stop CIT from 
challenging the validity of the sale, to remove the cloud on 
title, and to recover damages. 
In reply defendant does not dispute the additional facts of 
plaintiff in its opposition, but challenges some of the 
assertions as legal conclusions rather than facts. 
Thus, defendant claims there are no disputed facts 
concerning the slander of title cause of action. None of 
defendant's facts were disputed, other than characterizations, by 
plaintiff. Plaintiff's additional facts are not disputed by 
defendant, other than one being a legal conclusion. 
Because a sale is presumed valid does not make every 
challenge to it a false claim made with malice. The sale is not 
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conclusively valid until the court rules. The facts as they 
appeared at the time of the notice filed by defendant, not as the 
court has now found them to be, are to be examined. Defendant's 
actions were reasonable, though the court has rejected them. 
The complaint sought inconsistent remedies, that the sale 
was valid and so title was clear. Validation of the sale was a 
legal claim founded on statute. When plaintiff filed its motion 
for summary judgment it only pursued the equitable remedy of 
estoppel. The court ruled on September 22, 2006, that defendant 
is estopped from foreclosing its trust deed, not that the sale 
was valid. The remedies are thus inconsistent. Plaintiff has 
abandoned its right to legal redress having obtained equitable 
redress. 
DISCUSSION 
This basic summary judgment situation is not uncommon to the 
court. The intent with which conduct is accomplished must be 
determined by the court, either now or at trial. The "facts" are 
not really disputed, but the intent which surrounds those facts 
is in dispute. Thus, the question of summary judgment standards 
becomes much more difficult. The court will discuss its guiding 
legal principles as a basis for its decision. 
There is no jury trial demand and this court will be the 
ultimate finder of fact in this case. 
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In Andalex v. Myers, 871 P. 2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994), the 
court said: 
In granting a motion for summary judgment, a trial judge 
must consider each element of the claim under the 
appropriate standard of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
All U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (a party must make a sufficient 
showing to establish the existence of all essential elements 
of a claim on which that party will bear the burden of proof 
at trial); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 
254 (1986) (a party must prove a claim with clear and 
convincing evidence at the summary judgment stage if that is 
the burden required at trial); Robinson v. Intermountain 
Health Care, 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App. 1987) (in 
evaluating whether summary judgment should be granted, we 
must take into consideration the eventual standard of proof 
of each element of the claim at trial on the merits)." 
In 2005, the Supreme Court of Utah again cited Celotex in 
Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36. The Court cited Celotex 
to support the proposition that the nonmoving party must set 
forth facts "sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party's case'7 in order to properly defend 
against a motion for summary judgment. If the nonmoving party 
fails to sufficiently establish the existence of each element of 
his or her case, then the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. "In such a situation, there can be 'no genuine 
issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, All 
U.S. at 322-23 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ( c)). In Anderson, 
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the moving party did not base its motion on merely pointing out 
the failings in the nonmoving party's case, but instead came 
forward with some evidence to support its claim. Therefore, the 
court did not have to address the issue of whether a "showing" by 
pointing out the nonmovant's deficiencies is enough to support 
summary judgment. The Court only had to determine that once the 
movant had made a showing, the burden switched to the nonmovant 
to establish each element of their case. 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242 (1986) has 
discussed issues relevant here. A fact is "material" depending on 
the substantive law to be applied. In other words, it is the 
substantive law that identifies which facts are critical and 
which facts are irrelevant. A "genuine" issue is one where it 
involves evidence that is such that a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict for the nonmoving party. The inquiry is whether 
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require 
submitting the issue to a jury, or is it so one-sided that one 
party must prevail as a matter of law. It seems that the 
standard of proof applies to the question of "genuineness." That 
is, is the evidence sufficient enough to meet the standard of 
proof creating a genuine issue for the jury to decide. The 
Supreme Court said, " . . . there is no issue for trial unless 
there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a 
jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is 
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merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary 
judgment may be granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All 
U.S. at 249, 250 (internal citations omitted). The courts must 
decide if there is a need for a trial in that "there are genuine 
factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of 
fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either 
party." Anderson, All U.S. at 250. 
The United States Supreme Court compared summary judgment to 
a directed verdict. They are procedurally different, but in both 
cases the trial court must apply the standard of proof in making 
its determination. The Supreme Court instructed a trial judge to 
"bear in mind the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary 
to support liability . . . For example, there is no genuine issue 
if the evidence presented in the opposing affidavits is of 
insufficient caliber or quantity to allow a rational finder of 
fact to find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence" or 
whatever the standard of proof may be in the case. Anderson, All 
U.S. at 254. The Supreme Court went on to say: 
Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge 
must view the evidence presented through the prism of the 
substantive evidentiary burden. This conclusion is mandated 
by the nature of this determination. The question here is 
whether a jury could reasonably find either that the 
plaintiff proved his case by the quality and quantity of 
evidence required by the governing law or that he did not. 
Whether a jury could reasonably find for either party, 
however, cannot be defined except by the criteria governing 
what evidence would enable the jury to find for either the 
plaintiff or the defendant: It makes no sense to say that a 
jury could reasonably find for either party without some 
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benchmark as to what standards govern its deliberations and 
within what boundaries its ultimate decision must fall, and 
these standards and boundaries are in fact provided by the 
applicable evidentiary standards." 
Anderson, All U.S. at 254, 255. 
The Supreme Court warned courts that credibility 
determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of 
inferences from the facts are functions performed by the jury, 
not the judge, despite the affirmative language that the trial 
courts must view evidence through an evidentiary prism. The 
Court said, "The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and 
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." 
Anderson, All U.S. at 255. In summary, the Supreme Court said, 
". . . the trial judge's summary judgment inquiry as to whether a 
genuine issue exists will be whether the evidence presented is 
such that a jury applying that evidentiary standard could 
reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant." 
Anderson, All U.S. at 255. 
Only a few Utah cases have cited Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., All U.S. 242 (1986). Anderson is mostly cited for the 
proposition that summary judgment should be granted when a 
"reasonable jury could not find for the plaintiffs" on the 
evidence presented and that on a motion for summary judgment a 
trial judge must consider each element of the claim under the 
appropriate standard of proof. Therefore, it appears the 
discussion in Anderson is instructive and applicable to Utah 
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State Courts. 
The Utah Supreme Court has cited Anderson twice in 
defamation actions. In both Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 
1988), and West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994), 
the Utah Supreme Court cited Anderson to show the preference for 
pretrial summary resolution of defamation cases when it appears 
no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiffs. This is the 
only proposition for which the Utah Supreme Court has cited 
Anderson. 
To successfully defend against a motion for summary 
judgment, the nonmoving party must set forth facts 
"
!sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that partyfs case.'" Burns v. Cannondale 
Bicycle Co., 816 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.-317, 323, 91 L. Ed. 2d 
265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986)). Failure to do so with regard 
to any of the essential elements of that party's claim will 
result in a conclusion that the moving party "is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 420; see also 
Celotex, 411 U.S. at 322-23 ("In such a situation, there can 
be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,1 since a 
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of 
the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other 
facts immaterial." (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ( c)). 
Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36 523. 
Rule 56, URCP, mandates that summary judgment be awarded or 
denied "as a matter of law." "As a matter of law" includes all 
the various aspects and considerations of making a judicial 
determination including, but not limited to, the applicable law, 
the rules of evidence, and the parties' burdens at trial. 
However, the courts' decision can not include findings of fact 
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because that is the role assigned to a fact finder in a trial. 
The court must not weigh the credibility of evidence on a motion 
for summary judgment. Instead, the court can look at the 
sufficiency of the evidence according to the burdens of proof 
each party bears. If the court determines no reasonable jury 
could return a verdict for the non-moving party in light of his 
or her or its burden of proof, then the court may grant summary 
judgment. There are statements in cases that a single sworn 
statement is sufficient to create an issue of fact, however, this 
is often not true. Furthermore, there are other conflicting 
statements in cases that mere conclusions and opinion are not 
enough to defeat summary judgment. It seems a court is best 
advised to rest its decision on whether the evidence was 
sufficient in light of the burdens of proof. Thus, even though 
it only takes one sworn statement to dispute averments on the 
other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact, if the 
evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative 
summary judgment may be granted. While trial courts are 
admonished again and again not to "weigh" credibility or compare 
one affidavit to another, this process really is a weighing to 
some extent, as the court must examine whether the evidence would 
prevail before a fact finder. A party is required to come forth 
with admissible evidence to support their claim. The court 
should carefully scrutinize the submissions and contentions a 
non-moving party makes to see if those contentions and proposals 
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as to proof of material facts, if resolved in his favor, would 
entitle him to prevail. Bare contentions, unsupported by any 
specification of facts in support thereof, raise no material 
questions of fact to preclude the entry of summary judgment. 
Summary judgment is proper if no reasonable jury could rule in 
the non-moving party's favor. 
Here, as noted, there are no real disputes about pure 
"facts" but about the intention surrounding the conduct, the 
"factual" conduct. Of course intent is also a "fact" shown by 
inference from other facts in almost instances. "Where the 
parties are not in complete conflict as to certain facts, but the 
understanding, intention, and consequences of those facts are 
disputed, the matter is not proper for summary judgment and can 
only be resolved by a trial." Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291, 
1292 (Utah 1978). Here, it is not exactly the "meaning" of facts 
or their consequences, but the issue is what intent existed in 
the "mind" of an entity when a notice of default was filed. 
The difficulty here is compounded for two reasons: the 
nature of the dispute, and the identity of the trier of fact. 
Negligence cases are somewhat informative but not 
dispositive. In negligence cases the courts have often commented 
on the nature of those cases and the difficulty in handling 
such cases by summary judgment. That is because negligence, like 
the proof of malice, involves inferences. For example, because 
-15-
negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences from the 
facts, which is properly done by juries rather than judges, 
"summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only in the 
clearest instances." Trujillo v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 986 P.2d 
752 (quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 
1996)) (other citation omitted)." Also, "summary judgment is 
appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest instances." 
Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991)." 
"A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis of the 
facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ on whether 
defendant's conduct measures up to the required standard." 
Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). 
Again, here the court will be the trier of fact. It is not 
NOW the trier of fact in this motion, but will be at a trial. 
That normally would not matter for purposes of such a motion but 
in this case the court believes it does matter. 
Thus, this court does not weigh the credibility of anyone at 
this point. The question of malice often calls for inferences, 
and perhaps inferences upon inferences given that there is not an 
individual's intent which is at issue. The timing and course of 
events herein is not in dispute really. The "dispute," if it 
can be called such, is merely whether there was a malicious 
intent as that term is defined by our courts and as discussed by 
the parties. 
Further, the question of whether the statement, the notice 
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of default, was false to begin remains at issue but it is purely 
a legal issue. That is, there is no question that there was a 
default in payment, but legally if CIT's interest had been 
extinguished the notice was legally deficient. However, if one 
of the elements is not "provable" the other elements are not 
relevant. Thus, the court is focusing only on the "malice" 
element of a slander of title claim. If it cannot be proven, 
whether the other elements can be proven does not save plaintiff. 
Here, the court does not believe plaintiff's evidence could 
amount to the realistic probability that this court would find 
malice in the issuance of the notice of default by CIT. While 
CIT has been found to be wrong, the legal issues are not such 
that CIT could reasonably be found to have acted cavalierly or 
with any implied malice. As argued by CIT, the original 
trustee's sale did have defects and it is not unreasonable to 
believe those defects could "undo" or nullify the sale. It is 
not malicious to so believe or act on those beliefs. Plaintiff's 
claim is indeed "colorable" but not sufficient to this court that 
this court believes a reasonable fact finder (this court) could 
find the filing of the notice was with malice, express or 
implied. 
Given the burden plaintiff bears to prove slander of title, 
and given the basic unchallenged nature of the hard "facts" and 
sequences of events, and even though intent is a question of 
fact, the court believes the evidence presented by plaintiff is 
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insufficient to merit the expense and time of a trial to repeat 
that same evidence and attempt to show malice. The court 
understands plaintiff is being denied the ability to even attempt 
to prove its case on this claim of slander of title, but on 
balance the court believes that given the above discussion, the 
court may and does conclude that the evidence provided by 
plaintiff cannot show malice. Thus, as a matter of law defendant 
is entitled to judgment. 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the slander of 
title claim is GRANTED. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
DATED this day of //flf/U /, 2007 
/ / / 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
>\",H;?*,, 




CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 050500373 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail BASTIAAN K COEBERGH 
Attorney PLA 
WRONA & PARRISH PC 
1816 PROSPECTOR AVE STE 100 
PARK CITY, UT 84 0 98 
Mail DANA T FARMER 
Attorney DEF 
4723 HARRISON BLVD STE 200 
OGDEN UT 844 03 
Mail TYLER S FOUTZ 
Attorney PLA 
1816 PROSPECTOR AVE, STE 10 0 
PARK CITY UT 84060 
Mail MARK S MIDDLEMAS 
Attorney DEF 
10 701 S RIVER FRONT PARKWAY 
STE. IIC 
SOUTH JORDAN UT 84 095 
Mail JOSEPH E WRONA 
Attorney PLA 
WRONA & PARRISH PC 
1816 PROSPECTOR AVE STE 10 0 
PARK CITY UT 84098 
•a 
Dated t h i s //fi day of f\ A *,
 t j 2 0 ^ 7 f^ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) UUObJS 
